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NOTES
Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and the Constitution
On August 15, 1976, while an inadequate contingent of Detroit
policemen remained outside, scores of youths rampaged through
Cobo Hall, robbing and terrorizing the patrons at a rock concert. 1
City reaction was swift. The next day Mayor Coleman Young
promulgated a strict juvenile curfew,2 which the City Council quickly
affirmed by passage of an emergency ordinance on August 18.3
Detroit had been plagued with substantial juvenile gang activity
throughout the summer. In early August, amid growing pressures
to take effective action against crime-particularly juvenile crimeMayor Young announced stepped-up enforcement of the existing
curfew ordinance. 4 The Cobo Hall incident served as a catalyst for
further action. 5 Regardless of its actual effect on the crime rate,
the new curfew was psychologically effective as a visible sign of public resolve to combat crime.
The emergency ordinance enacted on August 18 made it .unlawful for any person under 18 to be on a public street, in a vacant lot,
or at ·any other unsupervised public place between 10:00 p.m. and
1. Detroit Free Press, Aug. 16, 1976, at lA, col. 6. Much of the source material
for this Note comes from documents provided by and taped interviews with Detroit
City Council President Carl Levin, Lt. Sherrill of the Detroit Police.Department, the
City Law Department, and Robert Ostmann of the Detroit Free Press. All of this
material is on file at the Michigan Law Review.
2. It was unclear whether the Mayor could declare a curfew sua sponte without
declaring a state of emergency; thus, those apprehended before the passage of the
ordinance were not prosecuted. See Interview with Lt. Sherrill of the Detroit Police
Department, in Detroit (Oct. 19, 1976), on file at the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter cited as Lt. Sherrill Interview]. But see State v. Boles, S Conn. Cir. Ct. 22,
240 A.?d 920 (1968).
3. Emergency Ordinance _of Aug. 18, 1976, 1976 JOURNAL OF THB CITY COUNCIL
1677-78 (amending DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE§ 36-3-1 to -2 (1964) ).
4. Detroit Free Press, Aug. 3, 1976, at 3A, col. 7. The existing curfew ordinance, DETROIT, MICH., CrrY CODE §§ 36-3-1 to -10 (1964), made it unlawful for
minors aged 14 to 16 years to be on the streets from midnight to 6:00 a.m. (from
1:00 a.m. on Friday and Saturday nights), and in certain public establishments from
11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. (from midnight on Fridays and Saturdays). Slightly earlier
times were specified for younger children.
Suggestions that a stricter curfew be enacted were rejected in August 1976 by the
City Council. Detroit Free Press, Aug. 6, 1976, at 4A, col. 3.
S. See text at notes 1-3 supra. In addition to the new curfew, large numbers of
laid-off police were immediately called back to duty and the police department was
restructured to get more patrolmen on the streets.
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6: 00 a.m. 6 On August 20, 197 6, the ordinance was amended to make
clear that the exemption for minors in the company of adults applied only to those children accompanied by their parent, legal
guardian, or other adult having care or custody of the minor.7 In
October the curfew provisions were made permanent8 with only two
minor changes. Sixteen- and seventeen~year olds were permitted
to stay out until 11 :00 p.m. on Friday and Saturday, and minors
6. Emergency Ordinance of Aug. 18, 1976, § 1, 1976 JOURNAL OF THE CllY
COUNCIL 1677-78 (amending DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE § 36-3-1 (1964) ),
The ordinance also made it
unlawful for a minor to be in a theatre; moving picture show, bowling room or
other place of amusement: (a) If such minor is under twelve years of age, between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. (b) If such minor is twelve years
of age and under eighteen years of age, between the hours of 9:30 p.m. and 6:00
a.m.
Emergency Ordinance of Aug. 18, 1976, supra, § 1, 1976 JoURNAL OF THE CI1Y
COUNCIL 1677-78 (amending DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE§ 36-3-2 (1964)).
At the same meeting, to aid in the enforcement of the curfew against juvenile
gangs, § 39-1-52.3 of the_ City Code was amended to require that any person stopped
for suspicion of criminal activity identify himself with verifiable evidence to the police
officer. Emergency Ordinance of Aug. 13, 1976, § 1, 1976 JOURNAL OF nm C11Y
COUNCIL 1679 (amending DETROIT, MICH., CI1Y CODE § 39-1-52.3 (1964)), This
section on its face is not limited to juveniles, although the context of its passage and
the content of its preamble, see DETROIT, MICH., 1976 JoURNAL OF THE CI1Y COUNCIL 1677-78, make clear that it was meant to deal with juvenile gangs.
This "stop and identify" section was the primary focus of the attacks on the constitutionality of the ordinance by the Detroit branch of the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) and the National Conference of Black ,Lawyers. See Letter from
Board of Police Commissioners to Mayor Young (Oct. 13, 1976) (on file at the
Michigan Law Review). In addition to the basic freedom of movement and equal
protection issues, which are discussed in text at notes 20-155 infra, the ACLU was
concerned about an invasion of the right of privacy if people were, in effect, required
to carry written identification, and about the lack of standards for determining when
a person could be stopped and required to identify himself. AOLU of Michigan,
Newsletter, Fall 1976, at 4, col. 1. Moreover, the two ordinances together set up
a Catch-22 situation that was of particular concern to the ACLU. A juvenile on
the streets after curfew hours who is stopped by the police and requested to identify
himself pursuant to this section has but two options. If he refuses to identify
himself, he violates the "stop and identify" ordinance. If he does identify himself
with one-of the standard forms of identification that indicates age, he is admitting
to a prima facie violation of the curfew ordinance. Thus, the ACLU contended that
the ordinances violated the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
This particular provision was, in fact, recently declared unconstitutional by the Michigan Court of Appeals. In People v. De Fillippo, C.A. No. 77-20 (Mich. Ct, App.
Dec. 6, 1977), the court found the ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague anct
held that the search provisions violated the fourth amendment's protection against
search without probable cause.
7. Emergency Ordinance of Aug. 20, 1976, § 1, 1976 JOURNAL OF THE CI1Y
CoUNCIL 1681 (amending DETROIT, MICH., CITY CoDE § 36-3-5 (1964)). The
amendment eliminated the exceptions for children out on emergency errands and parent-directed business.
8. Permanent Ordinance of Oct. 18, 1976, § 1, 1976 JOURNAL OF THE CI1Y CouNCIL 2054.
Despite some Council members' private misgivings about the effectiveness of a
curfew or its impact on innocent youths, the permanent ordinance passed unani-
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legally employed and carrying a signed statement from their employer indicating their work hours were exempted from one hour
before they started to work until one hour after they finished.
The Detroit ordinance is stricter than most municipal curfews. 0
Furthermore, the official city position was that it would be fully enforced.10 Actual enforcement, however, can best be characterized
as discretionary, 11 with the pattern of enforcement reflecting the
same concern over juvenile gangs that was the impetus for passage
of the ordinance.12
The Detroit ordinance, like all juvenile curfews, clearly restricts
the mobility of minors. Its effect on individual liberty is thus direct
and immediate. The contribution of such a law to the public welfare
is more subtle. While most criminal laws proscribe behavior that
is itself antisocial, there is nothing inherently antisocial about a 14year-old being out at 11: 00 p.m. Rather, a curfew is designed to be
instrumental: its ultimate purposes are to reduce the incidence of
juvenile crime, protect youths from the corrupting influence of
juvenile gangs, and reinforce parental authority. 13 These are indeed
laudable aims. However, given the restrictions imposed upon the
freedom to move about, the effectiveness of a curfew should be caremously. 1976 JOURNAL OF TIIB CilY COUNCIL 2054. There had been some -negative
reaction at a hearing on the curfew, primarily from young people affected by it, see
Detroit Free Press, Oct. 14, 1976, at 4D, col. 1, but the extensive comments from
the public received by the council had been almost entirely positive, Interv~ew with
City Council President Carl Levin, in Detroit (Oct. 19, 1976) (on file at the Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Levin Interview].
The Civilian Board of Police Commissioners at first questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance, Detroit Free Press, Aug. 20, 1976, at 3A, col. 6, which resulted
in ad hominem attacks on the board by members of the council, see id., Aug. 21,
1976, at lA, col. 3. The board did eventually endorse the ordinance.
9. For example, the age limit of the Detroit ordinance is relatively high and the
ordinance takes effect earlier in the evening than do most other ordinances. In addition, the ordinance allows almost none of the exceptions-e.g., for school events, authorized errands, or exercise of first amendment rights-that mitigate the harshness
of many other curfews.
For an examination of the provisions of curfew ordinances in general, see text
at notes 156-205 infra.
10. See letter from Police Chief Philip Tannian to City Council President Carl
Levin (Sept. 14, 1976) (on file at the Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter cited as
Tannian Letter].
11. Commander Richard Dungy of the Special Operations Division explained
that, "We're not going to be hovering around Cobo Hall asking peop1e for their IDs,
as long as they're orderly going to and from their cars." Detroit Free Press, Aug.
20, 1976, at 3A, col. 8. Lt. Charles Cargill of the Goals and Standards Section
said, "I think we have to use a lot of discretion in arresting children and taking them
to the precinct stations if they're not involved in gang activities," although he conceded that the ordinance did not allow for such discretion. Id. at lOA, col. 2.
12. See Lt. Sherrill Interview, supra note 2. Lt. Sherrill did indicate that lone
youths acting suspiciously after curfew hours have also been arrested.
13. See text at notes 121-35 infra.
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fully considered by both legislatures and courts. It was hoped that
the Detroit situation would provide some guidance on the effectiveness of a curfew, at least with respect to reducing the incidence of
juvenile crime. Unfortunately, the available data are inconclusive,14
· although the Detroit police claimed to have brought the juvenile
gang problem under control. 111
Recognizing that a legislature must decide whether to enact a
juvenile curfew without the benefit of conclusive data on the effectiveness of such laws, the remainder of this Note will focus primarily
14. A comparison of arrest records for August-September 1976 with those from
the same period in 1975 showed that juvenile arrests for serious crimes declined significantly during the new extended curfew hours, but such arrests increased more than
17% overall. Detroit Free Press, Oct. 115, 1976, at p. 3A, col. 6. In addition, lesser
juvenile crime--possession of stolen property, vandalism, carrying concealed weapons,
and so on-increased over 47% in the August-September period compared to the
same months in 1975, and this type of crime occurred just as frequently during the
extended curfew hours as it did in the same hours in 1975 without the curfew. Id,
These statistics might suggest that the curfew only shifted the hours when crimes
were committed, rather than reducing the total amount of crime. The data, however, are inconclusive, as shown by Tables 1 and 2 below: arrests were up for the
ncfncurfew period, but "warned and released" figures were down from the previous
year.
Table 1
OFFICIAL JUVENILE CONTACTS BY DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
Total
10 p.m.-6 a.m.
Aug.-Sept. 1975
883
293(33.2%)
Aµg.-Sept. 1976
lli12
221(19.9%)
The data for juveniles "warned and released," contained in Figure 2 below, show
a different pattern.
Table 2
CONTACT OF DETROIT POLICE WITII JUVENILES
Warned and
Official
Released
Contact
Total
Aug.-Sept, 1975
3505(79.9%)
883(20.1 % )
4388
Aug.-Sept. 1976
3107(73.6%)
11112(26.4%)
4219
The rise in official contacts may be the result of increased police stringency in
dealing with juveniles. (Data for Tables 1 and 2, which was provided by the Detroit
Police Department, are on file at the Michigan Law Review.) .
In any case, causal relationships are notoriously difficult to show with nonexperimental data. Several concurrent independent variables compound the problem of analyzing the effectiveness of the curfew. For example, the size of the active police
force increased, and the violence that precipitated the curfew, as well as the curfew
itself, may have led to increased control by parents over their minor children. In
addition, the members of the delinquent subculture were presumably aware of the increased determination by the authorities to enforce the law more vigorously against
juveniles. Moreover, the above statistics are also consistent with a shift in time
of juvenile crime, rather than a general reduction. Another weakness of any
analysis based on these statistics is that the variable we wish to study is the juvenile
crime rate, and, since we do not know the age of the perpetrators of uncleared crimes,
we can only measure rates of police contact with juveniles. Because of the rise in
gang activity and the new curfew in 1976, we cannot assume that the percentage of
crimes committed by juveniles remained constant. On the problem of measurement
in studying crime, see generally N. MoRRis & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST PoLmCIAN's
GUIDE TO CRIME CoNTROL 31-35 (1969),
15. See Lt. Sherrill Interview, supra note 2.
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upon the constitutional issues raised by such ordinances. 16 The freedom of movement that is limited by a curfew is, it will be argued,
an unenumerated right protected by the ninth and fourteenth
amendments. The constitutional rights of juveniles, however, -are
not necessarily coextensive with those of adults. Certain characteristics of juveniles-in particular, their lesser capacity for reason and
self-control-imply that the strength of their right to freedom of
movement is less than that of adults. The juvenile's right, then,
should not be accorded sufficient weight to overcome the substantial
countervailing public interests served by juvenile curfew ordinances.
Furthermore, since these ordinances do not involve either a suspect
classification or a fundamental interest, they should also withstand
an equal protection challenge.
Curfews vary widely in their specific provisions, however, and
under a balancing test excessively strict ordinances may unconstitutionally infringe the rights of juveniles. A wise legislature will not
go to the brink of constitutionality, but rather will enact a curfew
ordinance that provides the fewest possible restrictions on individual
freedom consistent with its purpose. A Model Ordinance, designed
with these considerations in mind, is set out in the Appendix. Finally,
the application of a curfew involves special problems of vagueness, 17
possible discriminatory enforcement,18 and possible use as a tool
to effectuate "pretext arrests" where less than probable cause for
a noncurfew arrest exists.19 The similarities of curfews to and their
differences from vagrancy ordinances suggest ways to minimize these
problems without limiting the usefulness of the curfew ordinances.
I.

A.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUVENILE CURFEWS

Constitutional Foundations for a Freedom of Movement

General agreement exists that "[a]bsent a genuine emergency
. a curfew aimed at all citizens could not survive constitutional
16. For an alternative approach to the problem, see Note, Assessing the Constitutional Validity of Juvenile Curfew Statutes, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 858 (1977), which
reaches somewhat different conclusions than this Note. See also Note, Curfew
Ordinances and the Control of Nocturnal Juvenile Crime, 107 U; PA. L. REv. 66
(1958). Another recent commentary on the constitutionality of juvenile curfews appeared in response to the district court's decision upholding one such ordinance in
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by
unpublished opinion noted at 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964
(1976), the first federal case to consider the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew.
54 TEXAS L. REV. 812 (1976). The state courts that have dealt with the issue have
reached conflicting conclusions. See Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 321, 339-48 (1974).
17. See text at notes 179-83 infra.
18. See note 211 infra.
19. See text at notes 218-27 infra.
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scrutiny."20 ~owever, the precise source of the constitutionally protected right that such a curfew would violate has not been clearly
identified. Consequently, an examination of the source and scope
of this right is necessary prior to a consideration of the extent to
which it is shared by juveniles.
Although indirectly restricting a variety of personal rights and
interests,21 a curfew most directly affects an individual's freedom to
move about in public. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has
proclaimed the importance of freedom of movement. 22 Some confusion, however, has existed regarding the source of this right, 23
stemming in part from the diversity of the cases that have discussed
the concept of freedom of movement. The cases concerning state
limits on interstate travel24 have involved issues of federalism20 and
infringement of other important interests or rights-such as voting20
or welfare27-in addition to freedom of movement, and thus their
relevance to an analysis of the freedom of movement is limited. The
cases dealing with international travel are somewhat more useful,
since they focus on the right to travel rather than on the right to
change one's residence. These cases, however, also involve other
20. Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari to Bykofsky v. Borough
of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964, 965 (1976). See, e.g., Hayes v. Municipal Court of
Oklahoma City, 487 P.2d 974 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); City of Portland v. James,
251 Ore. 8, 444 P.2d 554 (1968); City of Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash. 2d 405, 423
P.2d 522 (1967). But see Guidoni v. Wheeler, 230 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1916).
21. See People v. Chambers, 32 Ill. App. 3d 444, 449, 335 N.E.2d 612, 617
(1975), revd., 66 Ill. 2d 36, 360 N.E.2d 55 (1976), in which the majority held that
a juvenile curfew indirectly violated the first amendment rights of freedom of speech,
religion, assembly, and association, the exercise of which was dependent upon the
freedom to move about in public.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920), where the Court
reaffirmed the existence of a "fundamental right, inherent in citizens of all free governments, peacefully to dwell within the limits of their respective state, to move at
will from place to ,place therein, and to have free ingress thereto and egress therefrom."
23. Among the suggested sources have been the privileges and immunities clauses
of article IV, § 2, United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1920), and of the
fourteenth amendment, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring); the interstate commerce clause, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. at 172-73; and the due process clauses
of the fifth amendment, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958), and of the fourteenth amendment, William v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
24. The right involved in these cases might be characterized as a freedom to move
or to change residence. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
25. Article IV of the Articles of Confederation stated that "the people of each
State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State." It can be
argued that the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution was intended to
preserve this right. See United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294-96 (1920).
26. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
27. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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distinct issues, such as freedom of speech and association28 and
executive control over international relations. 29
The Supreme Court case that is most apposite to the freedom
of movement issues raised by curfews is Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 30 in which the Court held that a vagrancy ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague. 31 In referring to the ordinance's prohibitions on such conduct as "night walking," "loafing," "wandering,"
or "strolling," the Court noted that
these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we
have known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or
in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been in part
responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and
self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have
dignified the right of dissent and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirit rather than hushed, suffocating silence. 32

The fundamental role of the freedom of movement identified by
the Court in Papachristou suggests that "[t]he freedom to leave one's
house and move about at will is 'of the very essence of a scheme
of ordered liberty' . . . and hence is protected against state intrusions by the J):.;~ Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."33
28. See !.ptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (striking down a
statutory denial of passports to Communists).
29. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding an executive ban on travel
to Cuba).
30. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
31. 405 U.S. at 170-71.
A legislative enactment which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
language so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law-to wit, providing fair warning and notice of what is prohibited or
required so that one may act accordingly. . • . In addition, laws must provide
reasonably clear standards for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in
order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd.
by unpublished opinion noted at 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964
(1976).
The void for vagueness doctrine "has been used by the Supreme Court almost invariably for the creation of an insulating buffer zone of added protection at the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms." Note, The Void-For-Vagueness
Doctrine, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75 (1960).
32. 405 U.S. at 164.
The freedom of movement upheld in Papachristou has deep histotjcal roots, see
Z. CHAFES, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIIE CONS1TIUTION OF 1787, at 162-204
(1956), and was formally recognized in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights.
Article 13(1) states that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State." Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A(IIJ), U.N. Doc. A/777, at 912 (1948).
33. Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari to Bykofsky v. Borough
of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964, 964 (1976) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319,325 (1937)). See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1254
(1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted at 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 964 (1976).
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The fourteenth amendment might appear to be an appropriate
source for a constitutional challenge to curfew ordinances, for, in addition to incorporating and making applicable to the states34 many
of the substantive guarantees of the first eight amendments, 36 the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has been held to
subsume some rights not expressly mentioned in the Bill of Rights. 30
Relying on the fourteenth amendment alone as the basis for a freedom of movement may prove unsatisfactory, however, because of the
modem Court's tendency to determine the substantive rights contained in the due process clause only by incorporating the guarantees
enumerated in the first eight amendments. 37 The Court's hesitancy
to look beyond these enumerated guarantees is rooted in its rejection
of the judicial philosophy of the Lochner era, during which the Court
had employed the due process clause to invalidate state legislation
34. The Bill of Rights has been held to limit only federal power. Barron v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 410, 434 (1847). Although the rights enunciated in the Bill of Rights may
have been considered natural rights that were guaranteed rather than granted by the
Constitution, see E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1928), the framers did not intend to give the federal judiciary
the power to interpret and enforce these rights against the states. But see B. PATTER·
SON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 13-15, 36-43 (1955).
35. For example, the fourteenth has been held to incorporate and make applicable
to the states the eighth amendment, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
and the first, see, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Despite the advocacy of Justice Black, see, e.g.,
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), the
consensus seems to be that not all Bill of Rights provisions are made applicable to
the states by the fourteenth amendment. Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter believed
that the due process clause of the fourteenth included only those rights "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937);
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For example, due process now subsumes the right to counsel of the sixth amendment, see
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), but it does not include the seventh
amendment civil jury trial guarantee, see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62-63
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149
(1968) (inquiry switched to whether the safeguard was "fundamental to the American scheme of justice"). See generally Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" itz the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963); Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH.
L. R.Ev. 235 (1965).
36. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), holding that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment entitled juveniles to the procedural right to proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Black's strict constructionism led him
in, this case to reject any extension beyond the specific constitutional language. 397
U.S. at 377 (Black, J., dissenting); Cf. note 35 supra. See also Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 70 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
37. See generally Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 14 CoLUM. L. REV, 1410
(1914). But see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking
down, on due process grounds, a housing ordinance that limited categories of relatives
who could live together).
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that attempted to regulate economic activity. 38 The modem Court
has since overturned most of the decisions of the Lochner era, 39 refused to apply due process to economic regulation, 40 and spoken
forcefully against any activist jurisprudence in this area. 41 Of
course, the reluctance to apply substantive due process to economic
regulation does not necessarily preclude finding constitutional protection for the freedom of movement in the due process clause, for,
when legislation has threatened unenumerated noneconomic rights
-as in Griswold v. Connecticut42 and Roe v. W ade43-the Court
has been willing to strike it down by using, though not always articulating, a due process rationale. 44 However, given the uncertain application of the due process clause to unenumerated rights, attention
should be directed elsewhere to find a more solid basis for a constitutionally protected right to freedom of movement.
The judicial fear of an expansive "substantive due process,"45
38. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). For a general discussion of the evolution of the Court's views toward substantive due process
and economic regulation, see Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police
Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 689,
699-704 (1976); Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 419 (1973).
39. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Note, however, the continuing validity of the substantive due process cases from this era involving noneconomic rights, such as Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (education), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (same). See text at notes 42-44 infra.
·
40. The extent of judicial deference to legislative decisionmaking in this area can
be seen in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding prohibition on debtadjustment by non-lawyers); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (ban
on the fitting of prescription eyeglasses by non-optometrists valid); Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding ban on advertising on motor
vehicles).
41. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-31 (1963); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). "[W]ith the New Deal the very words [substantive due
process] became unmentionable for the Court." Henkin, supra note 37, at 1417.
See also Perry, supra note 38, at 705; Strong, supra note 38, at 449-54; cases cited
in notes 39-40 supra.
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965), discussed in text at notes 57-60 infra.
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court in Roe held, in a lengthy and somewhat
incoherent opinion, that a woman has a privacy-based right to have an abortion that
no governmental interest was sufficient to override until the last trimester of pregnancy.
44. The Court in Roe, in finding that the Texas abortion law unjustifiably invaded privacy and therefore violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, did cite decisions that made it clear that "only personal rights that can be
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' • • • are included
in [the] guarantee of personal privacy." 410 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added).
For the variety of rationales that led to the result in Griswold, see text at notes
58-60 infra.
45. Justice Black advocated abandonment of the substantive due process approach
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laden with the historical baggage that accompanies that phrase, can
be circumvented by using the ninth amendment to protect certain unenumerated constitutional rights, 46 including freedom of movement.
Although this analysis would require use of the fourteenth amendment to apply to the states the guarantees thus subsumed under the
ninth amendment, 47 this application would be no more offensive than
the current incorporation of provisions of the first eight amendments
into the fourteenth.
It is not inconsistent with constitutional history to give such a substantial role to the ninth amendment. 48 When James Madison
introduced a bill of rights 49 in the first Congress, he included what
became the ninth amendment to combat the danger that a partial
enumeration of reserved rights and powers would disparage any
rights that were not enumerated. 5° Commentators disagree about
the precise function Madison envisioned for the ninth amendment, Gt
and, in any case, it is unclear whether the framers shared Madison's
because he feared that its continued application would set the Court free, without
textual moorings, "periodically to expand and contract constitutional standards to
conform to the Court's conception of what at a particular time constitutes 'civilized
decency' and 'fundamental liberty and justice.'" Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 69 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). But cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 502 (1977) ("[The] history [of substantive due process] counsels caution
and restraint. But it does not counsel abandonment . . . .").
46. See Kauper, supra note 35, at 254-55.
47. See id. at 255; Ringold, The History of the Enactment of the Ninth Amendment and Its Recent Development, 8 TULSA L.J. 1, 17, 24 (1972).
At least one commentator has asserted that the ninth amendment was intended
to apply directly to the states. See B. PATTERSON, supra note 34, at 37.
48; For a more extensive discussion of ninth amendment history, see B. PATTERSON, supra note 34; Dunbar, lames Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA, L.
REv. 627 (1956); Ringold, supra note 47; Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 CALIF,
L. REV. 787 (1959).
49. The original Constitution contained no bill of rights because, said the Federalists, "an imperfect enumeration [of reserved powers] would throw all implied
power into the scale of government; and the rights to the people would be rendered
incomplete." 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON TIIE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 409 (2d ed.
1836) (James Wilson of Pennsylvania). See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 631 (J,
Hamilton ed. 1868) (A. Hamilton). Since many of the framers believed in natural
law, they equated "rights" with "areas of no legitimate government power," For a
critique of the contemporary natural-law approach to the ninth amendment, see text
at notes 61-65 infra.
50. It has been objected also against a Bill of Rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which
were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that
those rights which were not singled out were intended to be assigned into the
hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one
of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of
a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against.
I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the
fourth resolution.
1 ANNALS OF CoNG. 439 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) (remarks of J. Madison). See
also 3 J. SrORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 75152 (1st ed. 1833).
51. One commentator has used Madison's insistence that the tenth amendment
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intent. 112 Although the framers might have had a clear conception
of certain natural rights that the ninth amendment was to protect,
those rights were never specified. 53 During the first 170 years following the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the Court, on the rare occasions when the ninth amendment surfaced in constitutional adjudication, dismissed it as a truism. 54 The Court occasionally seemed
to confuse the ninth amendment with the tenth, reading the former
as well as the latter merely as restricting the federal government to
the powers specifically delegated to it, 55 rather than as a source of
rights that could check the exercise of otherwise legitimate federal
and state powers. 116
not inc,ude the word "expressly" as a limit on the "powers not delegated" to show
the extent of his federalism and, therefore, to show that the ninth amendment was
not intended to be a serious limitation on the government's power. Rogge, supra note
48, at 79. Dunbar, on the other hand, saw Madison as a libertarian who emphasized
the importance of reading both powers and rights broadly. Dunbar, supra note 48,
at 635. Franklin, who wished to use the ninth amendment in a penumbra-like
fashion, see text at notes 66-74 infra, rather than as a source of separate, natural
rights, cited a letter from Madison to Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, indicating his "fear
that a positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained
in the requisite latitude." Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method
and Its Implications for Republican Form of Governments: Griswold v. Connecticut,
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 40 TuL. L. REv. 487, 503 (1966). Thus, each commentator seemed to be able to find in Madison what he came looking for.
52. Relatively little debate on the ninth amendment occurred in the House. See
B. PATTERSON, supra note 34, at 16-17. The views of the Senate are even more obscure, since Senate debates from that period were not published.
53. Here, as with the fourteenth amendment, it may be that the framers did not
have a clear conception of those rights, but rather had only "vague aspirations." See
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5, 139 (1949).
54. See Tennessee Elec. Power· Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 330-31 (1936). See also Commonwealth & S. Corp.
v. SEC, 134 F.2d 747, 753 (3d Cir. 1943).
This reading of the ninth amendment occurred despite Chief Justice John Marshall's insistence that "[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution
is intended to be without effect." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
174 (11803).
55. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 15, 96 (1947), in which
the Court stated:
Therefore, when objection is made that the exercise of a federal power infringes
upon rights reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the inquiry must
be directed toward the granted power. . . . If granted power is found, necessarily the objection of invasion of those rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, must fail.
330 U.S. at 96.
56. Rights and powers are not always mutually exclusive. As Madison noted
when proposing the Bill of Rights, "The General Government has a. right to pass
all laws which shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the
collection are within the discretion of the Legislature: may not general warrants
[prohibited by the fourth amendment] be considered necessary for this purpose?"
I ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) (remarks of J. Madison). Thus,
if the ninth amendment ·is a source of rights, assertion of a legitimate power that
arguably infringes a ninth amendment right begins rather than ends the constitutional
analysis.
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The Court seriously discussed the meaning of the ninth amendment for the first time in Griswold v. Connecticut. 51 In that case,
the Court, through Justice Douglas, struck down a statute prohibiting
the use of contraceptives. Unfortunately, the Court reached no consensus on the source of the statute's unconstitutionality. Justice White
focused on the law's irrationality in achieving any legitimate state
purpose, 58 Justice Harlan relied on the due process clause, 110 and
Justice Goldberg-joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan-found the necessary source in' the ninth amendment alone,
which he viewed as protecting a variety of unenumerated "natural"
or fundamental rights. 60
Justice Goldberg's natural law approach has been adopted by
many of the commentators, 61 and it may be the most accurate reflection of the framer's conception of the ninth amendment, given the
importance of Locke and Coke in eighteenth century political
thought. A natural rights position, however, leaves no principled
basis for criticizing the decisions of the Lochner era, 62 which may,
in fact, more closely reflect the framers' conception of natural rights68
than Griswold or Roe. 64 If the Court is to enforce a concept of
57. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
58.. 381 U.S. at 502, 505-07 ·(White, J., concurring).
59. 381 U.S. at 499, 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
60. ''The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers
of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected
from government infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments." 381 U.S. at 486, 488
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
Justice Black, who dissented because the right asserted was not protected by a
specific constitutional provision, 381 U.S. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting), asserted that
the ninth amendment and due process arguments are "the same thing-merely using
different words to claim for this Court and the federal judiciary power to invalidate
any legislative act which the judges find irrational, unreasonable or offensive." 381
U.S. at 511. Justice Stewart also dissented because he rejected substantive due process, saw no infringement of any of the first eight amendments, and read the ninth
amendment purely as a limit on federal powers. 381 U.S. at 529-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
61. See, e.g., B. PA'ITERSON, supra note 34; Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309 (1936); Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth
Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L REV, 231 (1975);
Ringold, supra note 47; Note, Unenumerated Rights-Substantive Due Process, The
Ninth Amendment, and John Stuart Mill, 1971 Wis. L REV. 922.
Occasional judicial opinions have also expressed such natural rights ideas:
There are certain vital principles in our free republican governments, which will
determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as
to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for
personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government
was established.
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578,589 (1897); Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655,663 (1874).
62. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
63. See note 70 infra.
64. See the discussion of Roe in note 44 supra.
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natural rights not defined by the philosophy of the framers, it needs
some basis for defining which rights are "natural." 65
A suggested alternative approach for protecting unenumerated
rights draws on Justice Douglas' more subtle use of the ninth amendment in the plurality opinion in Griswold. After rejecting an unfettered substantive due process approach, 66 Douglas stressed that
the "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance," 67 citing several amendments, including the
ninth. The penumbra! approach suggested by Douglas demands not
merely reading each of the first eight amendments broadly, 68 but
also "project[ing] their total force beyond the texts themselves, so
as to derive a general principle stated in none of these amendments. "69 The first process is purely deductive, the second is inductive, but both begin with the text of the Constitution.
The ninth amendment must draw upon the contemporary meaning of the other constitutional provisions. Thus, even if the framers
intended to protect economic rights, 70 a strong ninth amendment will
65. Among those sources that have been suggested for a catalog of natural
rights are the U.N. Charter of Human Rights, see Paust, supra note 61, at 265; the
traditional rights of Englishmen, -see Kelsey, supra note 61, at 313-14; and John
Mill's On Liberty, see Note, supra note 61, at 932-36.
Despite their disagreement on the definition of natural rights, natural rights advocates are usually absolutists, asserting that such rights, once found, are immune
from any governmental infringement. B. PATTERSON, supra note, 34, at 4. See
Kelley, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. Cm. L. REV.
814, 822-23 (1966); Perry, supra note 38, at 694.
66. ''We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions."
381 U.S. at 482.
67. 381 U.S. at 484. Justice Douglas was refining a concept he had enunciated
in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961): "'Liberty' is a conception that sometimes
gains content from the emanations of other specific guarantees . . . or from experience with the requirements of a free society." 367 U.S. at 517 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
68. Deriving protection of symbolic speech from the first amendment is one example of broad constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969).
69. Franklin, supra note 51, at 490. One need not accept Franklin's contention
that the framers intended the ninth amendment to embody the use of a technique
analogous to that used in civil-law jurisprudence to find the approach both useful and
permitted by the text of the Constitution.
70. Dunbar, supra note 48, stated that the provisions included by Madison in his
Bill of Rights "with but one exception, were protections of civil and political rights
of individuals. . . . [Madison] rigorously excluded from his resolutions all the
numerous proposals of the States which would have obstructed in specific ways congressional powers over economic policy." Id. at 637. See also Henkin, supra note
37, at 1417. Most historians, however, believe that the framers' political philosophy
was one of limiting the power of government in the sphere of economics. See, e.g.,
C. BEARD, AN EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF 11lE CoNSTITUTION OF TIIE l,JNITED
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not necessitate a return to the Lochner philosophy if the current interpretation of the rest of the Constitution focuses upon personal
rather than economic rights. 71 Our understanding of the ninth
amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 72 Just as
a historical approach to the ninth amendment suggests that "the
rights reserved were to be of a nature comparable to the rights
enumerated," 73 a penumbra! approach ensures a continuing correspondence between reserved rights and enumerated rights. 74
A ninth amendment freedom of movement can be derived from
a contemporary reading of various other amendments under such a
penumbra! approach. Freedom of movement may be viewed as a
prerequisite to the exercise of certain first amendment rights-most
notably "the right of the people peaceably to assemble," 75 but also
the rights of association and even of speech itself. 76 Moreover, freedom of movement may be viewed as the essence of the liberty proSTATES (1913). This analysis seems to be supported by the existence of textual bases
for asserting rights against economic regulation, including the contracts clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I § 10, and the mention of "property" in the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.
71. Compare Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 532 (1972), and Home Bldg. & Loan
Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
72, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 358 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an
experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily
confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes . . . .
This is peculiarly true of constitutions . . . . In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what
may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. . . . Rights declared in
words might be lost in reality.
,
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). But cf, Rehnquist, The Notion
of a Living Constitution, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 693, 696-97 (1976) ("[a] mere change
in public opinion . . . should not change the meaning of the Constitution"),
73. Redlich, Are There "CertaiA Rights .•. Retained by the People?," 37 N.Y.
U.L. REV. 787, 810 (1962).
74. One clear limit imposed by such a correspondence is that the rights be rights
against the government, not from it. See B. PATTERSON, supra note 34, at 58; Redlich, supra note 73, at 812. For example, it would be distorting the history and the
text of the Constitution to find a right to education protected by the ninth amend•
ment. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
But see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 234 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("Those rights [not mentioned in the Constitution], like the right to pure air and
pure water, may well be rights 'retained by the people' under the Ninth Amendment").
75. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Ervin v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 194, 200, 163 N.W.2d 207, 210 (1968);
Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 IowA L. REV. 6 (1955). A curfew could be
viewed as a limitation on the time, manner, and place where first amendment rights
can be exercised. See generally Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH.
L. 'RE.v. 1482 (1970).
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tected by the fifth amendment, for to say "that you may move about,
at least within your own community, is simply another way of saying
that you are not imprisoned." 77 The eighth, amendment guarantee
against excessive baiF 8 expresses a similar concern about imprisonment that is not justified by public necessity. Freedom of movement, even if not directly deducible from any of these amendments,
is a part of the pattern formed when they are woven together.
It is important that limits be placed on the scope of the ninth
amendment, for an overly expansive ninth amendment could seriously threaten the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking much as did
the broad interpretation once given substantive due process. The
use of a penumbral-inductive approach to the ninth amendment does
not of itself place limits on an activist Supreme Court. With both
a sufficiently broad reading of penumbras and attenuated lines of
induction, "a theory of rights implied from the specifics of the Bill
of Rights can be pushed to the point where the distinction between
such 'implied' rights and the formulation of 'fundamental' rights in
the interpretation of the due process clause is wholly verbal and without substance. ,no
Two strategies, however, can be utilized to reduce substantially
the risk of such misuse. First, although the protection accorded the
core of such explicit rights as freedom of speech may be absolute,
the penumbra! rights of the ninth amendment must be developed
through a process of balancing. 80 This balancing should not, on the
77. J. TENBROEK, THE CONSTITUTION AND TiiE RIGHT OF FREE MOVEMENT
( 1955).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
79. Kauper, supra note 35, at 252.
80. Most of the treatment accorded the issue of balancing versus absolutism has
been in the context of the first amendment. See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82
(1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 ( 1961); Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109 {1959); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF TiiE FmST
AMENDMENT 53-58 (1966); P. KAUPER, CML LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 11125 (1962); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1963);
Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50
CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962).
Under an absolutist interpretation, any infringement of an activity subsumed under
the right is unconstitutional, regardless of the strength of the governmental interest
promoted. Alternatively, an activity that is determined to be outside of the right in
question is totally unprotected. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community.
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that "symbolic
speech" is not protected by the first amendment). Balancing, on the other hand,
although allowing the courts to take account of the relative strengths of the constitutional and governmental interests in a particular case, provides no guidelines for measuring the scope of the interests implicated or for designing the scales to be µsed in
balancing. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143-44 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
Both absolutism and balancing, when stated as dogma, involve intractable problems. Perhaps the approach of definitional balancing proposed in Nimmer, The
Right To Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and
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one hand, be entirely ad hoc. Both the asserted constitutional right
and the countervailing governmental interest should be considered
at a sufficient level of generality to provide a guide for subsequent
judicial and legislative decisions. The Court should take into account
not merely the adjudicative facts of a case, but also the legislative facts
that indicate the impact of a particular decision on society. 81 On the
other hand, ninth amendment cases cannot be resolved through application of Wechslerian. "neutral pI1inciples," which would demand that
no right be recognized unless a precise interpretation of its scope and
meaning could be made in the first case in which it arises and consistently followed thereafter. 82 The scope of ninth amendent rights is
not obvious in the abstract, so that "[b]y precluding the Court from
making a restrained and tentative move, a Wechslerian ninth amendment could destroy the Court's capacity to respond to the growing
needs of a changing society in all but the clearest cases."83
Second, the Court should engage in a dialogue with the political
branches on the content of ninth amendment rights. 114 The lack of
a textual anchor makes such a dialogue particularly important. sis
One technique for achieving the desired exchange is for the Court
to adopt a least drastic means approach when striking down legislation
that it believes contravenes the ninth amendment, thus permitting
the legislature to reconsider its actions and possibly to find a means
to fulfill its purpose that is less offensive to individual rights. 86 If,
however, the legislature has already seriously considered the asMisapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968), provides the most workable
solution.
81. See Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. Cr. REV,
75. One area in which a series of decisions has lead to the rudimentary development
of an understandable framework for application is the right to an administrative hearing. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Viewed together, these decisions indicate the beginnings of a principled rationale for when an administrative
hearing is required that lower courts and legislative bodies can apply. See generally
Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
82. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1 (1959).
83. Van Loan, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U.L. REV. 1, 43
(1968).
84. See Perry, supra note 38, at 716-18.
85. One of the traditional justifications for judicial review has been the judiciary's
special role in interpreting written documents. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch.) 137, 176-78 (1803) (stressing that this country has a written constitution
to which courts must look in determining the law applicable to a given case). In
ninth amendment cases, however, the existence and scope of the alleged rights depend
much more heavily on societal consensus, and therefore the courts have, perhaps, less
competence to define these rights than the legislature.
86. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). See also Tribe,
Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269 (1975).

November 1977]

Juvenile Curfew Ordinances

125

serted ninth amendment rights and determined that they are not
derivable from a contemporary understanding of the rest of the Constitution, the Court should defer to that judgment.87
B.

Curfews and the Constitutional Rights of Juveniles

Recognizing freedom of movement as a ninth amendment right
allows courts to weigh the legitimate interests of the state against the
competing interests of the individual when passing on the constitutionality of any limitations imposed on the freedom to move about.
Under the balancing approach, states may constitutionally impose a
variety of minor restraints on the movement of all citizens, such as
limiting drivers' licenses to those who demonstrate a specified level
of proficiency in operating an automobile, enforcing maximum speed
limits on streets and highways, and placing tolls on roads or
bridges. 88 Even quite drastic limits on freedom of movement are
permissible when the state interest is sufficiently strong. The cases
arising out of riot curfews consistently recognize the extent of the
infringement of individual rights, but they uphold the curfews because of the extraordinary nature of the situation89 and the lack of
any less· drastic alternatives. 90 Absent such powerful governmental
87. See generally Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 15 M1cir. L. RBv.
1162, 1172-83 (1977). To be sure, in most cases the challenge is to a regulation,
where. the concept of deference to the political branch is inapposite, or to a law whose
history does not reflect any serious consideration and reasoned rejection of the asserted right. Two examples of the sort of reasoned legislative consideration that
would invoke this type of deference are the debates over the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and over the grounds for impeachment during the Watergate crisis.
This close judicial examination of the legislative history in determining the constitutionality of a statute superficially resembles "motive review," which is generally
rejected by courts as an undue interference with legislative sovereignty. See Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). Motive review, however, involves invalidating
a statute that is constitutional on its face; here, in contrast, the Court would be upholding a statute that it would otherwise consider unconstitutional on its face because
it has decided to defer to a reasoned legislative judgment on the contemporary meaning of the ninth amendment.
88. If drivers' licenses were denied to 80% of the population or the speed limit
were reduced to 10 miles per hour on all roads to increase highway safety, or if the
toll on all bridges into New York were $50 to reduce congestion in the city, the infringement on freedom of movement might outweigh the advancement of the governmental interest.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 943 (1971); State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 178 S.E.2d 449 (1971); Ervin v.
State, 41 Wis. 2d 194, 163 N.W.2d 207 (1968). But cf. United States v. Matthews,
419 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1969), in which Judge Skelly Wright, dissenting from the
affirmance of a conviction under the District of Columbia riot statute, said that such
a law "threatens people with arrest merely for going outside their homes, even for
legitimate purposes. Individuals may properly fear that exercise of their rights peacefully to use the public streets to obtain food, to go to work, or to locate their families
will expose them to arrest on a serious criminal charge." 419 F.2d at 1194.
90. See Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556 (D.C. 1969). See generally Note, Judicial Control of the Riot Curfew, 11 YALE L.J. 1560 (1968).
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interests, the severe restrictions on the freedom of movement of
adults imposed by a general curfew would render it unconstitutional. 91 It is suggested, however, that such compelling interests are
not necessary to justify a juvenile curfew, because children differ
from adults in ways relevant to the extent of protection that should
be accorded their freedom of movement.
Although apparently recognizing the obvious fact ·that children
differ from adults, 92 the courts have yet to articulate clearly the relevance of these differences in terms of the constitutional rights of
juveniles. Early cases suggested that the special nature of children
somehow limited their capacity for full exercise of certain constitutional rights, thus allowing the state .to restrict the activities of
juveniles in ways that would be constitutionally impermissible if applied to adults. 93 More recently, however, the Supreme Court has
made it clear that "[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the
91. See text at note 20 supra.
92. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640-41 (1968).
93. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In that case, the Court
upheld a law forbidding minors to sell newspapers against a first amendment challenge by a Jehovah's Witness, explaining that "[i]t is the interest of youth itself, and
of the whole community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given
opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed ,. • . citizens."
321 U.S. at 165.
Recently the Court stated that it "long has recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults." Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
The framers almost certainly shared the belief that children lacked the capacity
for the full exercise of many basic human rights. The writings of the philosophers
from whom they drew much of their political thought reflect this conclusion. Locke,
for example, said that when a person is mature,
he is presumed to know how far that Law is to be his guide, and how far he
may make use of his Freedom, and so comes to have it; till then some Body
else must guide him . . . .
To turn him loose to an unrestrain'd Liberty, before he has Reason to guide
him, is not allowing the privilege of his Nature, to be free; but to thrust him
out amongst Brutes . . . .
J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 325, 327 (P. Laslett ed. 1960) (emphasis original). Similarly, Rousseau believed that "[w]e are born weak, we have
need of help; . . . we are born stupid, we have need of understanding. All that we
are not possessed of at our birth, and which we require when grown up, is bestowed
on us by education." 1 J. ROUSSEAU, EMILIE AND SOPHIE 4 (1783). Even John
Stuart Mill, the great libertarian, would not make his philosophy applicable to children.
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply
only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speakmg
of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that
of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being
taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as
against external injury.
J. MILL, ON LmER1Y 15 (World's Classics ed. 1912). This is because children are
not yet "capable of being improved by free and equal discussion." Id.
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Constitution and possess constitutional rights," 04 and thus has
struck down as unconstitutional laws and practices limiting children's
symbolic speech rights, 95 denying certain procedural protections to
juvenile court defendants, 96 requiring parental consent for abortions, 97
and prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to minors. 98 Other recent
decisions indicate, however, that the constitutional rights of juveniles
are not necessarily coextensive with those of adults. Thus, the Court
has refused to apply automatically to juvenile court adjudications all
the protections of a criminal trial, 99 including the right to a jury,100
and has denied the right to a hearing prior to corporal punishment
of students. 101 And in Ginsberg v. New York, 192 the Court upheld
a conviction under a statute defining obscenity more broadly for children than for adults, 193 prompting Justice Stewart to suggest in his
concurring opinion that "a State may permissibly determine that, at
least in some precisely delineated areas, a child . . . is not possessed

94. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977):
Thus minors are entitled to constitutional protection for freedom of speech,
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), West Virginia Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); equal protection against racial
discrimination, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); due process
in civil contexts, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); and a variety of rights
of defendants in criminal proceedings, including the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, In-re Wins/zip, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the prohibition of
double jeopardy, Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), the rights to notice, counsel, confrontation and cross-examination, and not to incriminate oneself, In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) and the protection against coerced confessions, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) ..
431 U.S. at 692 n.14. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) ("[W]hatever may
be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights
is for adults alone").
95. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist, 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
96. E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
97. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
98. Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
99. "We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these Constitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the State." In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
100. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
101. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
102. 390 U.S. 528 (1968).
103. The holdings in Ginsberg and Tinker illustrate that the Court recognizes
the existence of and limitations on children's constitutional rights. Although Tinker
acknowledges the first amendment symbolic speech rights of minors, Ginsberg suggests that children's first amendment rights are not coextensive with adults' rights.
Of course, somewhat different first amendment interests are involved in the two
cases. The definition of obscenity relates to the right to be informed and to have
access to broadcasts and publications without censorship. Symbolic speech, on the
other hand, relates to the freedom of self-expression and the right to express unpopular views-i.e., to the dissemination of ideas by juveniles rather than to them.
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of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition
of First Amendment guarantees."104
Given this somewhat inconsistent collection of decisions, it is not
surprising that a lack of uniformity exists in the presumptions of
various courts105 and commentators106 concerning the constitutional
rights of minors. 107 Some order can be brought to the cases, however, by reading them as limiting -the constitutional rights of children
only where the special characteristics of children are relevant to the
right in question. If children, because of their immaturity, are less
likely to exercise a particular right wisely, and if misuse of the right
may result in immediate harm or entail consequences that significantly limit later freedom, then these considerations should be reflected ).n $e scope of the right itself. 108 It is not inconsistent with
104. 390 U.S. at 649-50.
105. In S****S**** v. State, 299 A.2d 560 (Me. 1973), the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine, in upholding some rather vague standards for juvenile court jurisdiction, said: ,.
'
Just as the natural parent may constitutionally place limitation on the child's
freedom of locomotion and may substitute the will and judgment of the parent
for that of the child and thus constrain the child's will for his own protection,
so also may the State in the exercise of its parens patriae guardianship.
299 A.2d at 568.
• In contrast, in State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975), the Supreme Court of Washington upheld a minor's right to an abortion, proclaiming that
"prima facie, the constitutional rights of minors . . . are coextensive with those of
adults." 84 Wash. 2d at 904, 530 P.2d at 263.
106. Compare Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked Riddles, 39(3) LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 8, 12 n.13 (Summer 1975) ("a ruling against the child in a case involving an otherwise 'fundamental
right' should not tum on the circumstance of childhood itself") and Note, Parental
Consent Requirements and Prfracy Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1008-09 (1975) ("the Court appears to have determined
that, although important in other respects, capacity is not relevant in determining applicability of fundamental rights to minors") with Hafen, Children's Liberation and
the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their
"Rights,'' 1976 B.Y.L. REV. 605. Hafen asserts that "[w]hen children are involved,
a significant distinction can be drawn between legal rights that protect one from un•
due interference by the state or from the harmful acts of others and legal rights that
permit persons to make affirmative choices of binding consequence." Id, at 644. As
to the latter type of rights, restraints on minors are justified "to protect children from
the excesses of their immature faculties and to promote the development of their ability ultimately to assume responsibility." Id. at 613.
107. The oifficulties involved in defining the rights of juveniles have not escaped
the attention of the Court. "The question of the extent of state power to regulate
conduct of minors not constitutionally regulable when committed by adults is a vex•
ing one, perhaps not susceptible of precise answer." Carey v. Population Servs.
Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977).
10~. An alternative approach, suggested in 54 TEXAS L. REv. 812 (1976), compares the consequences of a denial of a particular right to adults vis-a-vis a denial
to minors in order to determine if the scope of that right should be narrower for
minors. Applying this analysis to juvenile curfews and the freedom of movement,
the author concludes that the importance of dating and other nighttime social activities to the healthy socialization of adolescents may require recognition that the right
to freedom of movement for juveniles is at least as extensive as for adults. Id. at
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the recent line of Supreme Court cases to consider freedom of movement a right of this character.
Freedom of movement differs from the rights to procedural due
process, which in general are not related to the maturity of the
individual and consequently cannot be abridged merely because the
person involved is not an adult. 100 Rather, freedom of movement
is more analogous to those rights that involve independent decisionmaking, such as the right of privacy inherent in the decision to
terminate a pregnancy110 or to purchase pomography111 or contraceptives.112 With respect to these rights, the Court has recognized
the relevance of minors' lesser capacity for making important decisions and has suggested that the state need not show as compelling
a governmental interest in order to restrict their exercise by juveniles
as when such restrictions are applied to adults. 113
819-20. The difficulty with this approach is that, in failing to consider the ability
to exercise the particular right safely and wisely, it ignores the minor's reduced judgmental capacity. Cf. Note, supra note 106, at 1008-09, 1011 n.73 (capacity not
relevant in applying fundamental right, although scope of right might justifiably be
narrowed by recognizing opposing state, parental, or family interests). See also notes
114-16 infra and accompanying text.
109. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
110. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) ("our holding
. . • does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy") (emphasis added).
111. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J,, concurring),
112. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977) (Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun concurring in part IV of the opinion); 431
U.S. at 702-03 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result with respect
to part IV); 431 U.S. at 713-14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
The extensive protection accorded the right of sexual privacy in Carey and Danforth does not necessarily imply that the burden on the state to demonstrate interests
sufficient to justify infringing upon the right of juveniles to move about freely will
be as difficult to overcome as in these sexual privacy cases. See Note, supra note
106, at 1009-11 (arguing need for compelling state interest to regulate juvenile access
to contraceptives). Even for adults, the right to freedom of movement is not as
broadly defined as the right to sexual privacy. Compare note 89 supra and accompanying text with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
This conclusion follows in part from the fact that decisions relating to sexual conduct are of a very intimate and personal nature--and thus not generally a legitimate
concern of the government-in contrast to the exercise of freedom of movement,
which may directly affect the interests of others.
Carey and Danforth may also be distinguished from the curfew situation by noting that there were potential long-term deleterious consequences-premature and unwanted motherhood-for the child stemming from the .denial of the rights involved
in those cases, whereas a restriction of rights under a curfew arguably has only shortterm negative consequences, but see 54 TEXAS L. REV. 812, 819-20 (1976) (curfew
inhibits "personal and social maturation").
113. See notes 110-12 supra and accompanying text. It is, of course, hardly a
unique result that the special qualities of juveniles justify granting lesser rights.
Minors below a certain age, for example, may not vote, see, e.g., MICH. CoNsr. art.
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Two components of maturation are particularly significant to the
exercise of the freedom of movement. The first, the ability to make
reasoned judgments, depends on intellectual capacity, which increases with age through early adulthood, 114 and on knowledge
and experience, which also grow over time. 115 Until individuals
develop a certain level of judgmental capacity, they are more likely
to follow momentary impulses and thus to engage in irresponsible
behavior without proper consideration of the possible consequences
to themselves and to others.116
2, § l; cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (11970) (upholding 18-year-old voting in
all federal elections), or marry, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.103 (1970), and
are required to attend school, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 380.1561 (West
Supp. 19.77); but cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding right of
Amish parents to exempt their children from state compulsory education system following the eighth grade). In each area, it is assumed that the child lacks the requisite
maturity to make a wise decision and that the adverse effects of an "immature" decision-outweigh the restrictions on the rights of juveniles. -In the voting area, the consequences of an unwise decision fall on society generally. In the other examples, it is
the child himself who is being protected from the irrevocable future consequences
of a rash act. Although a foolish adult will continue to be foolish, a foolish child
will likely outgrow his foolishness. Thus, limitations on the freedom of the child,
but not the foolish adult, are justifiable.
114. The I.Q. scale, for example, measures the ratio of intellectual to chronological age. See E. PEEL, TuE NATURE OF AnoLESCENT JUDGMENT (1971). Peel's experiments dealt with the development of intellectual judgment, but he notes the relevance
of I.Q. to moral judgment as well. See also J. ARONFREED, CoNDUCT AND CON•
SCIENCE 266 (1968), which states that older children are capable of greater "cognitive and verbal complexity which they can use to integrate their social experience." Thus, they can evalµate choices "in terms of broader principles of social
desirability or obligations" rather than "immediate consequences for the action." Id.
at 272.
It has been argued, however, that the relevant criterion is maturity, not age, and
thus that individual adjudications where the state must prove "demonstrable incapacity to make acceptable use of the opportunity in question" are required to justify
restrictions on the freedom of minors. Tribe, supra note 106, at 12. Nevt:rtheless,
the data suggest that differences between children and adults are sufficiently widespread to support the age generalization. Furthermore, ours is a system of lawsall of which involve imperfect categorization-and individualized determinations are
simply impractical in the context of a broad law such as a curfew.
115. The law already recognizes the significance of capacity and knowledge to
the genuine exercise of rights. Certain constitutional rights-e.g., not to be a witness
against oneself, to be free from search without a warrant, to a jury trial, and to counsel-may be waived. Such waivers are void, however, unless there was informed consent. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Von Moltke v. Gillies,
332 U.S. 703 (1948); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). But see Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 4112 U.S. 218 (1973). Cf. Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale
for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 15 MICH. L. RBV.
1214 (1977) (suggesting that no rights are permanently forfeited, even by a knowing,
intelligent waiver, unless the state is significantly disadvantaged by the waiver). To
be sure, these cases are concerned with an individual's capacity to waive rather than
assert rights. The right to represent oneself in a criminal trial, however, may not
be asserted unless the defendant is at least literate, although he need not possess
technical legal skills. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975).
116. For the basic study of the child's maturation process, see J. PIAGET, THB
MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 401-04 (1932). He posits three inevitably sequen-
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The second component of maturation relevant to the exercise of
the freedom of movement, adolescent conformity, intensifies the
problems created by diminished judgmental capacity. Studies show
that young adolescents are more responsive to peer pressures than
are younger or older persons. 117 This tendency toward conformity
is particularly significant in determining the scope of the right to
freedom of movement. Juveniles are not- yet capable of mature
moral judgments, and yet they are heavily influenced by their peers.
Granting them total freedom to wander about with their companions
encourages the formation of delinquent subcultures118 that are not
merely dysfunctional for society as a whole, but are dysfunctional
for their members as well. The combination of diminished judgmental capacity and relatively high susceptibility to peer pressure relates directly to the exercise by juveniles of freedom of movement
and justifies the conclusion that the right to this freedom can be
limited for juveniles in a manner that would be unconstitutional if
applied to adults.

tial stages of judgmental development: egocentrism, where rules are mere rituals to
please the child; authority, or heteronomy, where the child obeys rules because they
are laid down by others; and autonomy, where rules are obeyed because they seem
right. In the first transition-from egocentrism to heteronomy-"the mind stops affirming what it likes to affirm and falls in with the opinion of those around it." Id.
at 401. In the second transition, "[h]eteronomy steps aside to make way for a consciousness of good, of which the autonomy results from the acceptance of the idea
of justice." Id. at 404. Several researchers have since confirmed his thesis and
shown that the third stage is not generally reached until late adolescence. See gen-erally J. HORROCKS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AnoLESCENCE 557 (3d ed. 1969); A. KAY,
MORAL DEVELOPMENT 173 ff (1968); Kohlberg, Moral Development and the Education of Adolescents, in AooLESCENTS: READINGS IN BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOPMENT (E.
Evons ed. 1970). See also Comment, Rehabilitation as the Justification of a Separate Juvenile Justice System, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 984, 1011 (1976).
These studies also suggest that Mill was correct in excepting children from his
libertarian thesis. See J. MILL, supra note 93, at 11. If a person is not yet mature
enough to know what he wants for himself, then he cannot have freedom, but only
the illusion of freedom.
Although the unique characteristics of juveniles that justify curfews may not be
inherent, but rather might be "created" by a modern industrial society that delays
the natural development of the child, see Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social Context, 39(3) LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
38, 63 (Summer 1975), it remains true that teenagers in 20th century America are
not yet fully adult. See generally P. ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD (R. Boldick
trans. 1962).
117. See Castanzo & Shaw, Conformity as a Function of Age Level, in READINGS
IN AnoLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR (J. !tell & J. Shelton eds. 1971);
Query, The Influence of Group Pressures on the Judgments of Children and Adolescents-A Comparative Study, 3 AnoLESCENCE 153 (1969).
That younger children are not as susceptible to peer pressure might suggest that
the scope of their freedom of movement should not be thus limited, but their even
weaker judgmental capacity, see note 116 supra, counters this suggestion.
118. See, e.g., A. CLOWARD & L. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY & OPPORTUNITY (1960).
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Countervailing Governmental Interests

Having concluded that juvenile rights to freedom of movement
are weaker than the corresponding rights of adults, it follows from
the balancing test applicable to freedom of movement110 that governmental interests need not be as strong to justify a juvenile curfew
as to justify a general curfew imposed upon adults. 120 These governmental interests will now be examined to determine whether they
are sufficient to warrant the limitations on freedom of movement that
a juvenile curfew entails.
The governmental interests that have traditionally been advanced to justify juvenile curfews fall into three general categories:
protecting the community from juvenile crime and noncriminal mischief; protecting juveniles from harm beyond their control, such as
crime or accidents, and from delinquency-inducing situations; and
reinforcing parental authority. If enforced, a juvenile curfew would
undoubtedly inhibit the nocturnal activities of juveniles and thus be
expected to protect the community from typical juvenile mischief121
as well as from more serious crime and juvenile gang activity. 122
119. See text at notes 80-83 supra.
120. The separation made in the text between the legitimate scope of the juvenile's right to freedom of movement and the countervailing governmental interests
is somewhat artificial. Individual rights do not exist in the abstract, but rather are
defined in terms of limitations on legitimate governmental interests. Therefore, to
assert that juveniles have a less extensive right to freedom of movement relative to
adults may be considered equivalent to saying that the legitimate governmental interests in restricting the movement of minors are greater, That individual rights and
governmental interests are two sides of the same coin has been implicitly recognized
by one commentator in the context of the juvenile's right to sexual privacy. In criticizing the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Doe v. Planned Parenthood Assn., 29
Utah 2d 356, 510 P.2d' 75, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 414 U.S. 805 (1973)
(upholding parental consent requirements in the sale of contraceptives to minors),
the author of Note, supra note 106, suggests that "[t]he court might still have concluded that opposing state, parental, and family interests justified limiting minor's
access to contraceptives, either by narrowing the scope of the minor's privacy right
or by constituting concerns sufficiently compelling to warrant dilferential treatment."
Id, at 1011 n.73 (emphasis added).
121. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa.
1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted at 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 964 (1976), in which the local police chief testified that the principal complaints received concerning juveniles' activities during nighttime hours concerned
"vandalism, prowling, loud noise, and disorderly conduct." 401 F. Supp. at 1255.
122. The preamble to the 1976 Detroit juvenile curfew ordinance justifies the
ordinance as follows:
WHEREAS, there has been a dramatic increase in vandalism, robberies,
assaults, batteries and other such crimes in the City of Detroit brought about
by large numbers of roving, lawless minors, and
WHEREAS, there is need for effectively governing the conduct of such
minors in the City of Detroit for the purpose of alleviating and eliminating these
problems brought about by these large numbers of roving, lawless minors, and
WHEREAS, the citizens of Detroit urgently need protection from these roving, lawles!'> minors . • • •
Emergency Ordinance of Aug. 18, 1976, DBTROIT, MICH., 1976 JOURNAL OF TIIB CITY
CoUNCIL 1677-78.
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Hence the imposition of a juvenile curfew would seemingly promote
the first governmental interest.
This interest alone might appear sufficient to justify a juvenile
curfew, given that the right to freedom of movement is weaker for
minors than for adults because of the former's immaturity and its
supposed consequences. The argument might be made, however,
that any deprivation of this right should be justified only where the
governmental interest asserted to offset it is demonstrably related to
the immaturity of minors. Unless it can be related to the special
characteristics of children, the interest in protecting the community
from crime-an interest insufficient to justify imposition of a general
curfew123-would be insufficient to justify a juvenile curfew.124
Were this nexus required, the governmental interest in protecting the community from crime might be considered to be at least
indirectly related to certain characteristics of minors: immaturity,
with its attendant diminished judgmental capacity and greater submissiveness to peer pressure, makes more likely the perpetration of
certain crimes by juveniles. Teenagers do, in fact, have a higher
crime rate than adults, particularly with respect to spur-of-themoment crimes, such as vandalism, that might be prevented by a
curfew. 125
Moreover, it is unlikely that the courts would require such a
nexus between the governmental interest sought to be protected and
the special characteristics of minors. Courts generally are reluctant
to engage in "motive review,m 26 and thus, even if the actual motive
for imposing a juvenile curfew were to protect the community from
crime127 and the relationship between juvenile immaturity and com123. Unless the rate of criminal activity were to reach drastic levels sufficient to
constitute an emergency, a general curfew aimed at protecting the community from
crime could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. See text at note 20 supra.
124. For example, assume that a municipality had a legitimate interest in relieving pedestrian congestion in a certain section of town. The argument in the text
suggests that, even though the scope of the right to freedom of movement for minors
is less than for adults, the municipality could not prohibit the presence of children
on the relevant streets if the distinguishing characteristics of minors did not create
any greater propensity to cause congestion. As this example illustrates, the suggested
analysis resembles an equal protection approach. For a discussion of the validity of
juvenile curfews under an equal protection analysis, see text at notes 137-55 infra.
125. In 1975, for example, those aged under 18 constituted 23.1 % of all persons
arrested nationally for violent crimes, 48.0% for serious crimes and 65.4% for vandalism. U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES 1975, at 188, table 36. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,
401 F. Supp. 1242, 1255-56 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by unreported opinion noted in
535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976). The effectiveness of
curfews in preventing or reducing juvenile crime, however, is uncertain. See notes
14-15 supra and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); note 87 supra.
127. Protecting the community from juvenile crime was undoubtedly the dominant factor in the adoption of the Detroit curfew. See note 122 supra.
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munity protection were too indirect to justify the curfew, the restrictions would be upheld provided that other governmental interests
that are closely related to the distinctive characteristics of minors
could be posited. Prevention of juvenile delinquency, which will
be discussed below in connection with protection of juveniles, is one
such interest.
The second category of governmental interests promoted by a
juvenile curfew is the protection of minors, both from delinquency
and from harm beyond their control. Protecting minors from becoming victims of crime or accident, 128 though a laudable governmental purpose, is to some extent subject to the criticism earlier
directed toward the interest of protecting the community from
juvenile mischief and criminal activity: the interest would appear
to support a more general curfew. Although the special nature of
minors is generally thought to give the state, as parens patriae,120
128. Although it may seem incongruous to limit someone's rights in order to protect him from the misbehavior of others, courts have upheld laws that attempt to do
precisely that. See Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974), and Warshafsky v. The Journal Company, 63 Wis.
2d 130, 216 N.W.2d 197 (1974), each of which upheld restrictions on the activities
of young females but not males on the ground that such women needed special state
protection against criminal sexual assault. Cf. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 257.658(d)
(Supp. 1977) (requiring motorcycle operators and passengers to wear crash helmets).
129. Parens patriae is defined as "the sovereign power of guardianship [of the
State] over persons under disability . . . such as minors." BLACK'S LAW DrcrroNARY
1269 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
Most of the current discussion of the parens patriae doctrine has appeared in the
context of the juvenile court system. The justification for the system and the special
procedures it employs, often at the expense of many of the rights associated with
adult criminal trials, has been that juvenile proceedings are designed "not to punish,
but to save the child" through rehabilitation. In re Winship, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 299
N.Y.S.2d 414, 247 N.E.2d 253 (1969), revd., 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L REV. 1187 (1970);
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104 (1909); Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205 (1971).
In a series of recent decisions holding several elements of the juvenile justice system unconstitutional, the Court ruled that juveniles are entitled to the basic due process procedural guarantees, but, significantly, it refused to accord them the full
· panoply of rights granted adults. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
This denial of full procedural protection to juveniles is justified if we conclude
that the juvenile justice system is intended to be rehabilitative. The system is an•
alytically distinguishable from the adult criminal system, in which the state could not
constitutionally substitute better rehabilitation for due process rights of the defendant.
To a large extent the difference reflects the different theoretical bases of the juvenile
and adult criminal systems. We presume that adults have free will and reason and
thus can be punished for their criminal acts. Children lack full capacity for free
will and reason, and thus their behavior is to a far greater extent determined by their
environment, which suggests that the proper corrective response is rehabilitation
rather than punishment. See Faust, A Perspective on the Dilemma of Free Will and
Determinism in Juvenile Justice, 25 Juv. JUST. 54 (1974). However, if the juvenile
justice system is not fulfilling its rehabilitative role, then the justification for granting
juveniles less than full due process rights fails. That is, if the treatment for a juvenile
adjudged delinquent fulfills only the functions of deterrence and prevention, the
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a legitimate interest in protecting them that does not apply to
adults, 130 not all of the characteristics that make minors more likely
victims of crime are unique to children. Thus, the aim of protecting
potential victims of nocturnal crime and misadventure would also
support a curfew aimed at other citizens, such as the elderly, who,
like children, are generally physically less capable of defending
themselves than are most adults. 131 Immaturity is related in some
ways to protecting minors from external harm, however, for the
diminished judgmental capacity of minors might lead them to expose
themselves to unreasonable risk of harm if left to their own choice.
The second component of the governmental interest in protecting juveniles-preventing delinquency-is even more directly related to the special characteristics of minors. By applying a nocturnal curfew to restrict the freedom of movement of juveniles, the state
is merely recognizing that, if juveniles are allowed to roam about
freely at all hours of the night, the combination of diminished judgmental capacity and responsiveness to peer pressure can produce a
pattern of delinquent behavior. 132 Unlike those adults who have
settled into a life of crime, mischievous juveniles will often outgrow
their antisocial behavior patterns if they are prevented from engaging in rash acts with irrevocable consequences and from initiating
an escalating pattern of criminal activity. 133
.
The final justification that can be advanced for juvenile curfews
is that of reinforcing parental authority. The Supreme Court has
recognized that "[t]he legislature could properly conclude that
primary emphases of the adult system, then the juvenile should have coextensive
means to avoid such punishment. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21-27 (1967) (suggesting that due process would not inhibit the rehabilitative features of the juvenile
court, while also expressing doubt abgut the reality of rehabilitation).
130. This special interest is based on the same peculiar characteristics of juveniles
that justify according them lesser rights. See notes 92-108 supra and accompanying
text. Thus, Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), affd. sub nom. Gerstein
v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976), notes that the issue of minors' abortions can be analyzed in terms of whether "(1) all fundamental rights apply to minors, but the state
may sometimes assert an interest sufficient to justify the state action; or (2) minors
do not necessarily have all of the fundamental rights of adults." 517 F.2d at 790.
Since the Court has required a compelling interest to justify invasion of fundamental
rights, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and the facts distinguishing
juveniles from adults are often not so unassailable as to rise to the "compelling" level,
there are major practical differences between the two methods of analysis.
131. Cf. Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974) (upholding dormitory curfew applicable only to women
students partly on the ground "that women are more likely to be criminally attacked
later at night and are physically less capable of defending themselves than men").
132. See text at notes 114-18 supra.
133. In this respect a juvenile curfew reflects the basic assumptions underlying
the juvenile justice system. See Stiller & Elder, PINS-A Concept in Need of Supervision, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 33, 34-35 (1974). But cf. Fox, supra note· 129, at
1193 (rejecting involuntary rehabilitation of juveniles).
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parents and others . . who have this primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid
discharge of that responsibility." 134 A curfew ordinance reinforces
the authority of parents to impose curfews on their children and, by
ensuring that children are at home in the evenings, may ultimately
strengthen family unity. Even where a juvenile curfew infringes
upon parental child-rearing decisions, the countervailing governmental interests are sufficient to justify this interference. 1311
134. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
The State is not powerless to prevent or control situations which threaten the
proper functioning of a family unit as an important segment of the total society,
It may properly extend the protection of its laws in aid of the head of a family
unit whose reasonable and lawful commands are being disobeyed by children
who are bound to obey them.
Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550,557,270 N.E.2d 389, 394 (1971).
Many states supplement parental authority by granting juvenile courts jurisdiction
over a minor who "has deserted his home without sufficient cause or who is repeat•
edly disobedient to the reasonable and lawful commands of his parents," MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 712A.2(a) (2) (1970), or "is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually
disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful authority," N.Y,
JUD. LAW § 712(b) (McKinney 1963). Thus, the state appears ready to step in if
necessary, but family control of children is preferred.
135. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1264 (M.D.
Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) ("[t]he parents' constitutionally protected interest with
respect to the upbringing of their children, upon which the ordinance infringes only
minimally, is outweighed by the borough's interest in protecting immature minors and
in controlling and preventing nocturnal juvenile mischief and crime").
Like a compulsory school attendance law, a curfew serves to reinforce the wishes
, of most parents. Some parents, however, may prefer to give their children more independence, and in those instances the law does interfere with parental judgment.
However, although the parents have the primary authority for raising their children,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), when they are not acting to
further the child's best interests, "[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth's
well being, the state as parens patriae may res.trict the parent's control by requiring
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other
ways." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
The Supreme Court, however, may be hesitant to uphold, in the name of reinforcing parental authority, a regulation attempting to replace parental judgment entirely
with society's judgment. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 708
(1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part on the ground that, by prohibiting parents
from distributing contraceptives to their children, the statute unjustifiably interfered
with parental interests in rearing their children). And, since parents are generally
in a better position to respond to the individualized needs of their children, any major
disruptions of the parent-child relationship, such as removal from custody, would be
subject to "rigorous testing of the basis of any claim for benevolent state interven•
tion." Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact of
Wyman v. lames, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1259, 1293 (1971). See also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
In the final analysis, perhaps a curfew can be designed that would recognize both
the state's interest and the parent's interest in supervising the child. The parent is
certainly in a better position to evaluate her child's actual level of maturity, and thus
possibly a curfew should apply only to children who are out beyond certain specific
hours without parental consent. A recognition of the importance of the state regulatory interest and of the gross disparity between the societal norm of parental
supervision and the actual supervision by some parents, however, would require that
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In conclusion, the governmental interests in protecting the
community from juvenile mischief and crime, protecting minors from
potential delinquency and harm beyond their control, and reinforcing
parental authority generally outweigh the relatively limited rights of
children to freedom of movement. Thus, juvenile curfews are not
per se unconstitutional under the ninth amendment balancing test. 136

D.

Juvenile Curfews and Equal Protection

Since juvenile curfews. clearly discriminate against minors, they
also raise an equal protection issue that is distinguishable from any
ninth amendment claim. In determining whether state action
violates the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court has articulated two essentially distinct tests. Under one test, a statutory classification must be upheld if the scheme bears a "rational relationship"
to the ends sought to be achieved. 137 If, however, the state action
creates a "suspect" grouping138 or infringes upon a "fundamental"
right,1 39 the governmental interest advanced by the state action must
be "compelling" in order to pass constitutional scrutiny. 140 In addition, several cases have suggested an intermediate level of scrutiny
that would require that, although the state need not show that the
classification furthers a compelling state interest, it proves that the
classification used actually furthers the asserted state purposes.141
the ordinance specify various combinations of ages and hours beyond which the
state's interest would override parental consent. Some precedent for such an ordinance can be found in statutes specifying the age at which an individual can marry,
with marriage permissible at a somewhat lower age if consented to by the parents.
See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 55al02 (1975); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 551.103 (1977).
136. Because this Note uses a balancing rather than an absolutist model (where
the determination that a constitutional right is involved ends the analysis), the extent
of the infringement and the strength of the government interest advanced are relevant to the decision on constitutionality.
137. This is a very easy standard for the government to meet, since a "statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). See Williamson
v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
138. Race is universally accepted as one suspect classification: "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect."
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Alienage, Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), and national origin, Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633, 644-46 (11948), have also been designated as inherently suspect classes.
139. Among rights deemed fundamental are interstate movement, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969); procreation, Skinner v. OklahoI!}a, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942); and access to the judicial prgcess, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
17 (1956).
140. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). In no case since Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Japanese exclusion case, has the Court
found that the compelling state interest standard was met.
141. In the illegitimacy case of Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), the Court
said that the test "is whether the line drawn is a rational .one. . . . However that
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The age classification embodied in juvenile curfews rests on real and
substantial differences between adults and minors that clearly bear
a rational relationship to the purposes of these ordinances. 142 Thus,
juvenile curfews certainly meet the minimal-and probably meet the
intermediate-equal protection test of constitutionality. 148 The
governmental interests promoted by curfews are generally not sufficient, however, to constitute a "compelling state interest," 144 and
thus a juvenile curfew would be unconstitutional if it relied upon a
suspect classification or infringed upon a fundamental interest.
On a superficial level, age does appear similar to the suspect or
semi-suspect classifications of race, 145 illegitimacy,146 sex,147 and
alienage: 148 it is a personal trait over which the individual has no
control. 149 The reason for carefully scrutinizing laws that discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or alienage is that these categories,
though frequently used in the past, rarely bear any substantial relationship to the legitimate purposes of legislation. 1110 Strict scrutiny
might be, we have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights.•.."
391 U.S. at 71. A similar approach is discernible in the sex discrimination case of
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972),
which upheld the right of unmarried people to use contraceptives. Cf. Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-14 (1975) (declining to decide whether classification based
on sex is inherently suspect since line drawn was not "rational"). The problems with
and potential of this intermediate level of scrutiny are examined in Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972);
Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee:
Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. LJ. 1071 (1974); Note,
Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
142. Several cases have dealt with the equal protection challenge to juvenile curfews. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1264-66
(M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976); In re C, 28 Cal. App. 3d 747, 105 Cal. Rptr.
113 (1972); People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 862, 867-68, 161 P.2d 498,
501 (1945).
143. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1265 (M.D.
Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
144. In emergency situations such as times of riot, however, the state interest
with respect to adults as well as minors might be sufficient to be considered "compel•
ling." See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
146. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
147. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
148. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
149. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV, t1065,
1126-27 (1969).
150. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the Court, in a plurality
opinion, explained that "what differentiates sex from . • . nonsuspect statuses • • •
and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society." 411 U.S.
at 686.
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reflects a judicial distrust of any law that uses such classifications. 151
On the other hand, although age is also a common basis for classification, it is not an irrational one. Because significari.t differences
in judgment and maturity justify most of the discriminations against
minors, 152 age is not-and should not be-a suspect classification. 153
State action also requires a compelling justification if it infringes
upon a fundamental interest. Although freedom of movement
might well be a fundamental interest for adults,1 54 it is not a fundamental right for children. 155 Consequently, a juvenile curfew should
be upheld in the face of an equal protection challenge to its constitutionality.

II.

SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF JUVENILE CURFEWS

Because courts and legislatures must deal with particular
ordinances, they must look beyond the facial constitutionality of
juvenile curfews in order to determine whether the specific provi151. Ely suggests that the choice of suspect classifications is based on "we-they"
discriminations, with "we" being those in control of the legislative process. Ely, The
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974).
Although juveniles are not themselves represented in legislatures, legislators are not
separated from and possibly antagonistic to them in the way they might be_ toward
blacks, aliens, or the illegitimate, and, therefore, in this respect juveniles do not
qualify as a suspect class.
152. See generally text at notes 92-118 supra. Of course, if there is no connection between the benefit or burden of the law and the special characteristics of
minors, then an age-based classification would be unconstitutional even under the rational basis test. See, e.g., Morales v. Minter, 393 F. Supp. 88 (D. Mass. 1975)
(striking down a law limiting general welfare benefits to those aged over 18).
153. Often one of the characteristics of a suspect classification is the stigmatization it imposes on the members of that class. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 494 (1954). Treating juveniles differently from adults does arguably
"stigmatize" them, but this factor would be insufficient to require a compelling state
interest. Our culture already applies special treatment to juveniles in many ways, including such clearly necessary legal distinctions as compulsory education, contractual
incapacity, and the denial of voting rights; thus the marginal stigmatic effect of a
curfew law is minimal. Children also grow out of being children, so that the stigma
is less personal. Moreover, even though the stigma argument seems stronger for discrimination against the old, the Supreme Court, in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), declared that age was not a classification requiring strict scrutiny and thus that a state could mandate retirement of police at
age SO under the rational basis test.
154. See text at notes 20-22 supra:
155. See text at notes 109-18 supra. A parallel might be drawn to the right to
vote, which, although a fundamental interest, see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), may be denied to those below a certain age, cf. Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (invalidating portion of the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970 lowering the' voting age to 18 in state and local elections).
Again, the interest is fundamental only to a limited group of people. But cf. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Rig~t To Vote?, 15 MICH. L. REv.
1092 (1977) (asserting that no persuasive argument exists to support the denial of
voting rights to permanent resident aliens).
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sions156 of a given curfew are so unreasonably restrictive that the
ordinance is unconstitutional. Curfew ordinances may vary with
respect to at least five specific types of provisions: age limits, time
limits, exceptions provided, sanctions imposed, and whether the
ordinance prohibits "being" or "loitering" on the streets. Excessive
strictness in one or more of these areas may lead a court to find an
ordinance unconstitutional. 157 Since neither the necessity nor the
effectiveness of curfews has been conclusively demonstrated, 1118 a
legislature should strike the balance more strongly in favor of individual liberties than is constitutionally required, as suggested in the
Model Curfew Ordinance set forth in the Appendix.
The curfew ordinances that have been challenged in the courts
have had maximum age limits ranging from sixteen159 to twenty-one
years, 160 with the most common upper age limit being eighteen. 161
A legislative body should give careful consideration to the maximum age to which the ordinance should apply, for, as the age
limit increases, the child's interests in freedom of movement strengthen
while the municipality's regulatory interests weaken. A seventeen-year-old has a stronger interest in going to a movie, a social
activity, or a sporting event in the evening than a thirteen-yearold. Concurrently, the increasing maturity that comes with age
lessens,the legitimate concerns about the minor's incapacity for wise
decisionmaking and vulnerability to peer pressures. 162 In addition,
curfews with high age limits no longer clearly serve to reinforce
parental authority, 103 for at some point the parents' concern with
training their children for independent decisionmaking begins to out156. When specific curfew provisions are discussed in this Note, they will usually
be cited to the cases in which they were challenged, since municipal code books are
not generally available.
151. See, e.g., Alves v. Justice Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 306 P.2d 601
(11957); Hayes v. Municipal Court, 487 P.2d 974 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
The constitutionality of various curfew provisions is quite unclear. The Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242
(M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976), postponed any conclusive ruling on the merits of
curfews. The many state court cases, see, e.g., cases cited supra, because they start
from different assumptions both about the general equal protection and due process
issues discussed in the text at notes 88-155 supra and about the appropriate level of
deference to legislative judgments, do not present any coherent pattern in their
treatment of ordinances of varying strictness.
158. Cf. note 14 supra an~ accompanying text (discussing Detroit situation).
159. See Hayes v. Municipal Court, 487 P.2d 974 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971):
Baker v. Borough of Steelton, 17 Dauphin County Rep. 17 (Pa. 1912).
160. See Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate for Ocean City, 236 Md. 548, 204 A.2d
688 (1964); Ex parte Mccarver, 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S.W. 936 (1898).
161. See Note, •107 U. PA. L. REV. 66, supra note 16, at 70.
162. See text at notes 114-18 supra.
163. See notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text.
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weigh their interest in shielding the children from possible adverse
influences. 164
Although the relevant criterion for determining the group to
which curfews should apply is really maturity, 165 which of course will
vary greatly among persons of the same age, an ordinance must draw
a precise age line somewhere. 166 The choice, within very broad
limits, is a matter for legislative discretion. 167 None of the court decisions dealing with juvenile curfews has focused directly on the
legitimacy of the age limits chosen, although the limits selected may
be one element in the judicial balancing. Any limit higher than
eighteen would be difficult to justify, since eighteen is the voting age
specified in the twenty-sixth amendment to the Constitution168 and is
the maximum age used in most other statutes limiting the rights of
minors. 169 Since the age limit for juvenile court jurisdiction170 is
based on very similar considerations of immaturity and impressionability, it would seem reasonable to use the same age for the upper
limit in a juvenile curfew, as the Model Curfew Ordinance set forth
-in the Appendix has done. No one should be deemed too mature
164. One of the concerns of the Detroit ACLU is the undercutting of parental
authority by the curfew, since under it parents are no longer free to determine the
timing of their children's shift to independence. Interview with Paul Harbrecht,
Director of Detroit ACLU, in Detroit (Oct. 19, 1976) (on file at the Michigan Law
Review).
165. See notes 113-18 supra and accompanying text.
166. Any attempt to measure maturity more directly-by psychological testing,
for example-would be both administratively unworkable and a substantial invasion
of privacy.
Cases such as Morales v. Minter, 393 F. Supp. 88 (D. Mass. 1975), overturning
a rule denying general welfare benefits to persons aged under 18, are inapposite. As
the Morales court stated, "[t]his case must be distinguished from those in which individuals were classified according to subjective expectancies of maturity to perform
a certain function . . . . In those cases a line, however subjective, had to be drawn
somewhere. In this case, the drawing of any line, without reason, cannot stand."
393 F. Supp. at 100 n.17 (emphasis original).
167. Cf. Perdido v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 420 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir.
1969) (finding reasonable a statute limiting to citizens over 2'1 the right to have their
parents reside in the United States).
168. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
169. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 12-46-112 (1976) (prohibiting sale of alcoholic
beverages to those below the age of 18); IowA CooE ANN. § 47.4(1) (West Supp.
1977) (voting age 18). But see Thistlewood v. Ocean City, 236 Md. 548, 204 A.2d
688 (1964), the only 20th century case construing a curfew with an age limit as high
as 21. In upholding .the curfew, the court said that "Maryland has recognized, as
have other states, that the activities and conduct of those under twenty-one may be
regulated and restricted to a far greater extent than those of adults." 236 Md. at
557, 204 A.2d at 693. The·trend toward an 18-year age limit has accelerated since
1964.
170. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 712A.2 (1970) (setting age limit at 17);
N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1976) (setting age for juvenile delinquency at 16; for persons in need of court supervision- at 16 for males, 18 for
females).
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for the rehabilitative effects of the juvenile court and yet too
immature to be allowed outside alone at night.
The time limits between which a curfew is imposed also require
precise, if somewhat arbitrary, delineation. 171 The curfews that
have been subject to judicial examination began between 9:00 p.m.
and midnight. 172 Curfews generally are lifted at "daylight" or at a
specified hour such as 6:00 a.m.17 3 The setting of time limits, like
that of age limits, is a legislative determination requiring a careful
balancing of interests. If the limit is set too early, it will interfere
with minors' attendance at commercial affairs such as plays or sporting events and make the scheduling of church and school affairs
difficult. Data on when juvenile crime is committed might suggest
a natural time around which a curfew could be structured. 1 u
Some ordinances have recognized that maturation is a continuous
· process by setting later time limits for older juveniles. 175 Although
staggered age and time limits make the curfew more responsive to
the changing interests of both the individual and the municipality,
they also increase the difficulty of enforcement.17 6 Consequently,
the Model Curfew Ordinance suggested by this Note provides a
single time limit applicable to all ages, 177 relying upon explicit exceptions1 78 rather than staggered age and time limits to accommodate
the legitimate interests of older juveniles.
A third element of curfew ordinances, whether they prohibit
"being" or "loitering" on the streets, has received explicit judicial
· attention. Some courts have found ordinances unconstitutionally
171. See Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1976). In that
case, the Second Circuit was able to avoid the other constitutional issues presented
since "[t]he failure to provide the hour at which the curfew ends, makes the ordinance void for vagueness." 545 F.2d at 818.
172. See Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 66, supra note 16, at 71.
173. Id.
174. The author could not find such material in published sources. Since most
major city police departments have access to computer facilities, it would be relatively
simple for them to generate the necessary data and thus enable the city to tailor its
ordinance more precisely to local needs.
175. The curfew upheld in City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 2d 212, 220
N.E.2d 126 (1966), set hours of darkness to dawn for children under 12, 11 :00 p.m.
to 6:00 a.m. for children between 12 and 16, and 12:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. for children
between 16 and 18. The Detroit ordinance in effect before August 1976 was particularly intricate. It set hours of 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. for children under 12,
11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. for those between 12 and 14, and 12:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m.
for 15- and 16-year olds, with an extension until 1 :00 a.m. for the latter on Friday
and Saturday. The ordinance also set different, stricter hours (also varying by age)
for the time when children were required to be out of theatres, bowling alleys, and
other places of amusement. DETROIT, MICH., CI1Y CODE §§ 36-3-1 to -2 (amended
by Emergency Ordinance of Aug. 18, 1976, § 1, DETROIT, MICH., 1976 JOURNAL OP
THE Cl1Y COUNCIL 1677-78).
176. See Note, 107 U. PA. L REV. 66, supra note 16, at 71-72.
177. See the Appendix infra.
178. See text at notes 184-98 infra.
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vague (for using "loitering") or overbroad (for using "being") ,179
but the better view, articulated in recent cases, is that this factor is
without practical significance. 180 To avoid the ~oncern courts have
expressed over the vagueness of "loitering" language in vagrancy
cases181 and because the inclusion of numerous exceptions will elimiate much of the concern with overbreadth that has accompanied the
use of "being" language,1 82 the Model Curfew Ordinance suggested
by this Note makes it unlawful for juveniles to "be •in or upon any
public street . . . or other public place" during specified hours. 183
The greatest difficulty in designing an effective yet constitutionally acceptable curfew ordinance lies in specifying the exceptions
that are to be provided. An ordinance that is so general that it prohibits too much innocent behavior might well fail to survive constitutional scrutiny. 184 Courts upholding ordinances have found that the
exceptions to the general prohibition of nocturnal activity were sufficiently broad to protect most innocent behavior. 185 The exceptions
179. The court in Hayes v. Municipal Court, 487 P.2d 974 (Okla. Crim. App.
1971 ), held that the word "loitering" is unconstitutionally vague because it is unclear
how long one must be on the streets to come under its proscription. ·Furthermore,
it has been said that "being" language, which might cover the most brief and harmless incident, is defectively overbroad. See Alves v. Justice Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d
419, 306 P.2d 601 (1957). Yet it is difficult to conceive of language that does not
suffer to some extent from one of these two defects, since in many areas, such as
traffic laws, the law cannot be precisely delimited only to conduct that is in fact dangerous.
180. Se.e, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1252
(M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976). See also Note, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 66, supra note
16, at 73.
181. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
182. See Alves v. Justice Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 306 P.2d 601 (1957).
183. See the Appendix infra.
184. See Seattle v. ·Pullman, 82 Wash. 2d 794, 799, 514 P.2d 1059, 1062-63
( 1973) ( one of the criticisms or an invalid curfew was that its four exceptions were
"not exhaustive and fail[ed] to account for the many other possible 'innocent' acts");
Alves v. Justice Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 424, 306 P.2d 601, 605 (1957) (curfew
struck down as "an arbitrary invasion" of "inherent personal rights and liberties" because its broad prohibitions would make unlawful such innocent behavior as attendance at dances, church, theater, and sporting events bearing no rational relationship
to the purposes of the statute). Accord, In re Doe, 54 Hawaii 647, 513 P.2d 1385
(1973); Ex parte Mccarver, 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S.W. 936 (1898). See also
Hayes v. Municipal Court, 487 P.2d 974, 980 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) ("to forbid
people from being on public streets as a preventive measure rings of a totalitarian
police state operated for the efficiency of the government and not in the interests
of a free people").
185. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa.
1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 964 (1976); In re C, 28 Cal. App. 3d 747, 757, 105 Cal. Rptr. 113, 121
(1972). Bykofsky upheld a curfew that "contains numerous exceptions that allow
minors to be on the streets during the curfew hours when they have a specific, important, legitimate purpose for being there." 401 F. Supp. at 1256. In addition, the ordinance made special provision for binding mayoral advisory opinions with respect to
the official interpretation of the ordinance, a provision the court relied on in part
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must be carefully drawn, however, in order to avoid opening loopholes or making the ordinance too complex to administer fairly.
Juvenile curfew ordinances generally make an exception for
children accompanied by a parent, guardian, or other responsible
adult, although wide variation exists in the language used to delimit
the category of responsible adults. 186 To be effective, an ordinance
should avoid treating a nineteen-year-old ringleader as a "responsible adult" accompanying a gang of fifteen-year-olds. 187 In addition, since one purpose of a curfew is reinforcement of parental control, an ordinance should require that the exception applies only if
the child's parent or guardian has authorized the adult to accompany
the child, either generally or for a particular occasion. The
legitimacy of the parental approval could be verified when the
parents are called to take the child home after a suspected violation.1ss
Other exceptions are generally made for children involved in
what the legislature determines to be legitimate, innocent activities.189 One of the more common exceptions applies to children
in holding that the curfew was not unconstitutionally vague. 401 F. Supp. at 1248,
1252.
186. E.g., City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 2d 212, 213, 220 N.E. 2d
126, 127 (1966) ("accompanied by a parent, guardian or some responsible person
over the age of twenty-one (21) years, or a member of his family eighteen (18) years
or older"); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1246-47 (M.D.
Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) ("adult authorized by the parent to take the parent's
place in accompanying the minor"); DETROIT, MICH., CilY CODE § 36-3-5 (1976)
("other adult having the care or custody of the minor").
187. Regardless of the particular language employed, however, the police enforcing such ordinances generally make their own determinations about the maturity of
the accompanying adult. If the accompanying adult is of "parental" age or demeanor, the police are unlikely to stop the youth. If the adult seems to be very
young or does not appear to be exercising care over the minor, the police may suspect
a curfew violation. The common practice upon a suspected curfew violation, whether
contained in the ordinance, see 2A T. MATIHEWS & B. MATTHEWS, MUNICIPAL
ORDINANCES § 40.39 (1972), or not, is to telephone the parents or guardian to· pick
up the child. See Lt. Sherrill Interview, supra note 2. It would be fairly simple
while making this call to determine whether they have approved of the accompanying
adult as a custodian for their child. For a discussion of one of the drawbacks of
this approach, see note 188 infra.
188. One potential problem with this procedure is that, under most ordinances,
parents are liable for permitting their children to violate curfew, see note 204 infra
and accompanying text. Since the pUfPOSe of the inquiry is to determine whether
the child, and thus the parent, has violated the ordinance, there might be fifth
amendment problems in asking such a question without a Miranda warning, at least
under the Escobedo "focus of investigation" test, see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
489 (1964).
189. One infrequently enacted but very reasonable exception is for the youth in
front of his own house or adjoining building. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, app. at 1269 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976). Given
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who are legally employed. 190 Typically, the exception allows for
commuting time and requires certification of the place and hours of
employment. 191 Two types of legitimate activities for which exceptions would seem desirable but that are likely to create difficulties
in enforcement are errands and organized evening activities. Although a parent should be able to send a child to the drugstore at
10:15 p.m. without risking the child's arrest, a broad exception for
parental errands might open an excessively large loophole. The
approach adopted in at least one ordinance is to require written
authorization, 192 but this does not fit the usual patterns of family behavior and would be a trap for the unwary or the illiterate. Rather,
the legitimacy of the claimed errand, like the authorization of an accompanying adult, 193 could be verified when the parents are notified
of a suspected curfew violation. 194
The other important exception that might create enforcement
difficulties is that for minors returning from commercial and other
organized activities. The exceptions should cover commercial activities such as movies, concerts, and sporting events,195 as well as
activities sponsored by the church -or school, and should allow minors
one-half hour after completion of the event to return home. To
the unbearable atmosphere inside a tenement apartment on a hot summer night, it
scarcely seems wise municipal policy to threaten the arrest of those teenagers who
seek the relief of their own front stoop. For examples of other typical exceptions
for legitimate activities, see 401 F. Supp., app. at 1269-71.
190. See, e.g., People v. Chambers, 66 Ill. 2d 36, 37, 360 N.E.2d 55, 56 (1976);
Alves v. Justice Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 420-21, 306 P.2d 601, 602-03 (1957).
Even the relatively strict Detroit curfew includes this exception. See DETROIT,
MICH., CITY CoDE § 36-3-5(b) (1976).
In some circumstances an exception for returning from or going to work would
be unnecessary since the hours during which a minor is proscribed from working may
encompass the curfew hours. For example, in Michigan a minor under 16 may not
be employed between 9:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., and juveniles 16 to 18 years of age
may not be employed between 10:30 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., except that nonstudents 15
years old or over may work until 11:30 p.m. MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 409.17-.18
(1970).
191. See, e.g., DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE§ 36-3-5(b) (1976).
192. See City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wash. 2d 794, 795 n.1, 514 P.2d 1059,
1060 n.1 (1973).
193. See text at note 188 supra.
194. By checking with the parent be/ore the child has an opportunity to speak
with him or her, the risks of collusion are minimized. However, it is vital that city
authorities be sensitive to and take precautions against any discrimination by police
in determining when they believe the minor and when they hold the child pending
confirmation by the parent.
195. Several ordinances only provide exceptions for school and church functions,
with no reference to other social activities. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF PuBLic AFFAIRS, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, IOWA MODEL ORDINANCES, tit. V, ch. 4, § 4 [hereinafter
cited as IOWA MODEL ORDINANCES]. It is best, however, to exempt commercial activities expressly, even though the police will often make ad hoc exceptions for such
events. See note 11 supra & notes 207-14 infra and accompanying text.
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simplify enforcement,196 registration of all noncommercial nocturnal
activities that minors might be expected to attend could be required. 107
Some ordinances do not exempt such activities as movies but
instead apply curfew prohibitions not only to such public places as
streets and parks, but also to moviehouses, bowling alleys, and
restaurants, holding the proprietor liable for curfew violations. 108
Although prohibiting well-behaved attendance at such places does
not seem entirely consistent with the purposes of a juvenile curfew,
certainly enforcement would be complicated if minors were allowed
to remain in commercial establishments beyond curfew hours and
given a •half-hour grace period in which to return home. Consequently, the Model Curfew Ordinance suggested by this Note does
not grant an exemption for minors returning from such establishments, although the Model Ordinance does not extend ,the curfew
prohibition into the establishments themselves. 109
Finally, although an exception might be made· for juveniles who
are out alone and tllus not subject to peer pressure to engage in
criminal activity, proper reflection ~ggests that an ordinance should
not be limited to minors in groups. Juveniles out alone do risk being
harmed by others and may be acting in defiance of parental authority. More important, enforcement would be impossible if members
of a gang could avoid arrest simply by scattering at the sight of a
police officer.
Most municipal ordinances do not set out specific sanctions for
curfew violations, but rely instead on general municipal code provisions regarding ordinance violation. 200 The particular sentences imposed for curfew violations are irrelevant if curfews apply only to
those young enough to come under juvenile court jurisdiction, where
the sente1,1cing criteria are based on rehabilitation rather than
the specific crime proved. Some ordinances, such as the Iowa
196. To be sure, even a carefully written exception for legitimate organized activities creates difficulties in enforcement and may conflict with the goal of reinforcing
parental authority. Difficulties can arise in determining whether in fact a particular
youth actually attended an event or remained until the conclusion. In addition, such
an exemption might appear to condone juvenile activity beyond the hours individual
pa!ents set for their children.
197. Concern has been expressed over the civil liberties implications of such registration. See Levin Interview, supra note 8. If registration need only list place and
time and the police have no discretion over granting the exception, these fears would
seem unfounded. The minimal registration requirement, however, would still prevent
legitimization of the meetings of juvenile gangs such as the Errol Flynns or B.K.'s
of Detroit.
198. See, e.g., DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE §§ 36-3-2, -6 (1976); IowA MODEL
ORDINANCES, supra note 195, tit. V, ch. 4, § 5.
199. See the Appendix infra.
200. E.g., a violation of the Detroit ordinance can be punished by up to a $500
fine or 90 days imprisonment, or both. DETROIT, MICH., ClTY CODE§ 1-1-7 (1974).
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model ordinance, impose sanctions only on habitual violators. 201 Although such a· provision reflects the actual enforcement pattern in
many cities, 202 it should not be built into the ordinance itself, particularly in a large, anonymous municipality. Recent popular criticism
of the juvenile justice system reflects increasing concern over the
awareness of juvenile offenders that they can· engage in much unlawful conduct before any sanctions are imposed. 203 Such enforcement
certainly should not be written into a curfew ordinance.
In addition •to sanctions for juvenile offenders, many curfew ordinances also provide sanctions for parents or guardians who permit
their children -to violate the curfew. 204 Such sanctions would increase compliance, since the police cannot apprehend most curfew violators. To ensure proper parental assistance, a parent should
be held responsible for negligent as well as willful violation of the
ordinance.205

III.

PATTERNS OF ENFORCEMENT

As has been indicated, curfew ordinances are not per se unconstitutional, although unnecessarily restrictive provisions may prompt
a court to invalidate a particular ordinance. 206 A pattern of enforcement that is sufficiently violative of constitutional rights, however,
could lead a court to conclude that the ordinance is unconstitutional
as applied or could even tip the constitutional balance against the
ordinance itself. - Two major grounds relied upon by the Supreme
Court in invalidating vagrancy ordinances have been the high risks
of discriminatory enforcement and the use of arrests under these ordinances to avoid the fourth amendment requirement of probal:,le
cause for arrest. 201 Information on the enforcement pa,ttern for the
Detroit curfew reinforces the suspicion that the same problems occur
in the enforcement of juvenile curfews. 268
201. lowA MODEL ORDINANCES, supra note 195, tit. V, ch. 4, § 6.
202. See, e.g., Lt. Sherrill Interview, supra note 2.
203. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Sept. 8, 1975, at 66.
204. See, e.g., DETROIT, Mice., CITY CODE§ 36-3-7 (1976).
205. See, e.g., Model Curfew Ordinance in the Appendix infra. Cf. City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 2d 212,220 N.E.2d 126 (1966) (overturning a parent's
conviction under a provision penalizing parents who permit a minor to violate curfew
"for lack of any proof of scienter"). The proper standard should-be that the parent
"knew or should have known his child was violating the ordinance." See NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS, MODEL ORDINANCES SERVICE § 7-405
(1973), making it unlawful for a parent "to suffer or permit or by inefficient control
allow such violation."
206. See text at notes 156-205 supra.
207. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S, 156 (1972). _See also
text at notes 218-29 infra.
208. See note 11 supra; Lt. Sherrill Interview, supra note 2. A similar pattern
of enforcement in Philadelphia is described in Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 66, supra
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Despite an official policy of full enforcement, the Detroit ordinance is not as strictly enforced as a literal reading of the ordinance
would suggest, 209 and there is no reason to believe that the pattern
in Detroit is atypical. The lack of full enforcement is not merely
a result of limited police resources,' however. 210 Instead, police decide not to arrest some people they find violating the ordinance on
the basis of certain deliberate, though not always articulated, criteria.
Although some criteria, such as race, are impermissible, 211 many of
the exceptions likely to be applied informally by the police should
be perfectly valid, since they often are precisely the exceptions a
good ordinance would include. The question then becomes whether
note 16, at 81-87. See also Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104
U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956).
209. In a letter to the City Council president, then-Police Chief Tannian assured
that the general orders of the Police Department paralleled the ordinance exactly
and "clearly requires that all offenders shall be arrested." Tannian Letter, supra
note 10. In actuality, the police see the ordinance as a "tool," see notes 11Jl2 supra
and accompanying text; the policeman is expected to use his discretion, and the
implication is that a well-behaved teenager coming directly home from a movie at
11 :00 p.m. might be warned that he was violating curfew, but would not be arrested.
Bill Gray, a columnist for the Detroit News who was concerned about the impact of
the curfew on attendance at rock concerts at the city-owned Cobo Arena, spoke to
Commander Richard Dungy of the Special Operations Division. Dungy said that
"[t]echnically, they [the under-18 patrons at Cobo] are in violation of the ordinance,
but we're not going to stand at the door after a show and grab them. If they get in
their cars and go home-directly home-we won't bother them with curfew enforcement. . . . But the same people walking down Woodward after 10 p.m. would be
subject to the ordinance." He referred to this as a policy of "enforcement with
discretion." Detroit News, Sept. 22, 1976, at 27A, col. 1.
A major impetus for the passage of the ordinance, the juvenile gang phenomenon,
has also been a major focus of its enforcement, Indeed, the police seem to treat the
ordinance as a means to allow them to break up such gangs after '10:00 p.m. without
having to wait for a noncurfew crime to be committed.
210. The effects of less than full enforcement can be taken into account by lawmakers. See Note, Laws That Are Made To Be Broken: Adjusting for Anticipated
Noncompliance, 15 MICH. L. REV. 687 (1977).
211. See People v. Harris, 182 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (App.
Dept. Super. Ct. 1960), in which the court said that a black defendant accused of
gambling could introduce in defense evidence that the gambling laws were not enforced against whites. However, the court stated that "[d]iscriminatory law enforcement, to constitute a want of due process of law, and a denial of the equal protection
of the laws, must be intentional, and purposeful." 182 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 842,
5 Cal. Rptr. at 855. The use of intentional discrimination on the basis of race, and
not merely discriminatory effect, as the appropriate criterion for equal protection analysis has been recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp,,
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
Police enforcement is more likely to vary depending on the neighborhood in
which the juvenile is confronted rather than on the race of the suspect. In Detroit,
for example, curfew arrests would be more common in the heavily black, crime-ridden
12th Street neighborhood than in the more suburban northwest Detroit area. Discrimination by neighborhood _is not impermissible, however, see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Salzburg v. Maryland, 346
U.S. 545 (1954), unless its intent is to discriminate on the basis of race, Griffin v.
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1964).
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it is proper to· delegate the authority to formulate those exceptions.
to the police officers on the beat. 212 Such low-level decisionmaking
can produce inconsistency, since the patterns of enforcement may
differ from officer to officer. Consequently, the public's knowledge
of the enforcement criteria will be far more imprecise than for a
formal law or regulation. 213 In addition, since such decisions are
made neither by a politically responsive legislature nor by an agency
required to follow any specified procedure, there is no opportunity
for public input. Finally, the on-the-street administration of the enforcement criteria is essentially invisible to the courts, and thus they
are deprived of an adequate opportunity to review this conduct. 214
One solution to such uncontrolled and nonuniform decisionmaking by patrolmen might be to impose a requirement of administrative rulemaking on the police department. 215 A better solution,
and one that would avoid the issue of excess delegation of authority,
would be to have the legislative body set out the desired exceptions
212. Lt. Sherrill of the Detroit Police Department said that police would naturally
use their discretion in enforcing the Detroit curfew. See Lt. Sherrill Interview, supra
note 2. Since the Police Chief has committed the Department to full enforcement,
however, see text at note 10 & note 209 supra, the discretion in the system must occur
informally and at the lowest level of the police hierarchy.
213. Cf. The Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l) (1970) ("a
person may not . . . be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in
the Federal Register and not so published," unless he has actual notice of it). In
one sense, of course, no one is adversely affected by a policeman's informal rules
that narrow the scope of the law. Yet people may rely on the law as it is generally
enforced and then be arrested for behavior within one of the exceptions that the
police have made but are not bound to continue to make.
·
The exceptions would be more acceptable if they were simply a reflection of enforcement priorities, like the IRS rules of thumb on what triggers an audit, since it
would defeat the purpose of the unannounced rul~s if people were able to change their
behavior to fit them. However, curfew exceptions such as that for minors returning
home from a school play reflect a decision by either the legislature or a patrolman
that the behavior in question is not within the purposes of the curfew, rather than
any decision about the allocation of enforcement resources. Reliance on the exception should not then subject one to the risk of an unchallengeable arrest.
214. Courts are reluctant even to hear equal protection-based claims that the criteria for enforcement are unconstitutionally discriminatory, since the effect of a decision upholding the claim would be to free one admittedly guilty of violating the
law. See People v. Fort, 133 Ill. App. 2d 473, 273 N.E.2d 439 (1971); Society of
Good Neighbors v. Von Antwerp, 324 Mich. 22, 36 N.W.2d 308 (1949). Courts
would be still more reluctant to overturn a conviction on a claim that a policeman
had ignored his normal, nondiscriminatory criteria for making an arrest in order to
harass a particular defendant, even if that could be proved. See, e.g., Rutkin v.
United States, 343 U.S. 130, 145-47 (Black, J., dissenting) (use of income tax laws
as subterfuge for punishment of other crimes). See generally Tieger, Police Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement, 1971 DUKE L.J. 717; Comment, The Right to
Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1103
(1961). But cf. Note, Murguia v. Municipal Court: California Recognizes the Defense of Discriminatory Prosecution, 6 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 885 (1976).
·
215. This is the solution to police discretion consistently promoted by Professor
Kenneth Davis. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975); Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 703 (1974).
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in the ordinance itself. 216 The ordinance could then better reflect
the community's consensus on the degree to which the curfew must
impinge upon individual liberty. In an abstract sense, such an ordinance might be vaguer than a strict curfew without exceptions, but
it would in fact provide greater notice and predictability than would
a strict curfew narrowed by the individual patrolman's assessment
of the appropriate exceptions. 217
An additional problem of selective enforcement peculiar to curfews and vagrancy ordinances is their common use as a substitute
for arrest on probable cause: 218 a police officer who thinks-but
does not have probable cause to believe219-that a juvenile has committed or is about to ·commit a crime might arrest the youth for a
curfew violation solely in order to have the opportunity to verify his
suspicion by the common post-arrest investigatory techniques of interrogation, a search of the suspect's person and possessions, and so
on. As they have done with vagrancy ordinances, courts could invalidate curfews as one means of avoiding the danger of such pretext
arrests. This drastic solution seems inappropriate, however, both
because substantial governmental interests are advanced by curfews
and because juveniles-the subjects of a curfew-have a weaker
constitutional interest in freedom of movement than do adults, the subjects of a vagrancy statute. 220 And, under curfew ordinances, unlike vagrancy ordinances, it is unlikely that most arrests are made
216. Specification by the legislature is not politically impractical, as exemplified
by the fact that some of the ordinances considered in the case law contain extensive
exceptions. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp, 1242, 126971 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976); City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wash. 2d 794, 79S
n.1, 514 P.2d 1059, 1060 n.1 (1973).
217. To be sure, some courts have overturned curfews, see In re Doe, 54 Hawaii
647, 513 P.2d 1385 (1973), or parts of curfews, see Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1250 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted
in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (exception for
"normal . . . nighttime activities"), as unconstitutionally vague. Such decisions may
invite the legislature to turn over the job of refining the law to the police.
218. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169-71 (1972). See
generally Y. KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 29093 (4th ed. 1974).
219. On the necessity of probable cause for an arrest, see generally Whitely v,
Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15-17 (1948),
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), the court summarily
dismissed any justification for vagrancy ordinances as a means of "nipping crime in
the bud." 405 U.S. at 171. Juvenile curfews, however, unlike general vagrancy
ordinances, are a legitimate tool for preventing young people from falling into a pattern of criminal behavior. See text at notes 132-33 supra. Yet they should not be
misused as a "cloak for a conviction which could not be obtained on the real but
undisclosed grounds for the arrest." 405 U.S. at 169. Juveniles, as well as adults,
have the right to be free from illegal arrests.
220. See text at notes 92-118 supra.
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to avoid the probable cause requirement for arrest for more serious
crimes. 221
It would be desirable, nevertheless, to find some means to deter
police misuse of juvenile curfews short of invalidating these ordinances. One alternative would be to prohibit the use of evidence found
in a search incident to a curfew arrest in any prosecution for another
crime. This rule, however, would be at once both too broad-since
many curfew arrests are legitimate-and too narrow, because of the
peculiar nature of the juvenile court system. The usual juvenile
court procedure allows the state, in the course of proving a _curfew
violation, to present evidence related to other suspected crimes222
for which the state might in fact lack sufficient evidence to convict. 223
The juvenile judge then has complete discretion in selecting the appropriate sentence or "treatment" for the child, 224 which could be
as severe as would have been imposed for the suspected offense. 225
A drastic but more effective solution would be to throw out the
case entirely if the defendant proves that he was the victim of
a subterfuge arrest. The potential result under this policy might
seem somewhat paradoxical: juveniles suspected of committing
more serious offenses would be immune from curfew convictions. 226
221. The primary focus of a curfew ordinance is against large groups of minors
wandering aimlessly at late hours, without any necessary connection to another specific crime. See, e.g., the Preamble to the 1976 Detroit juvenile curfew ordinance
quoted in note 122 supra.
Lt. Sherrill of the Detroit Police Department claimed that, since most gang members individually are cowards, the scattering of the group caused by enforcement of
the curfew will reduce the rate of crime committed by gang members. Lt. Sherrill
Interview, supra note 2.
222. Cf. MICH. CoMP. LA.ws §§ 712A.17 ("The Court may conduct hearings in
an informal manner . . . ."), -.18 (1970) (disposition "shall be appropriate for the
welfare of said child and society in view of the facts so proven"). Thus, the police-·
man, in giving evidence to prove curfew violations, could relate the time, place, and
surrounding circumstances of the event-facts that might well suggest to the judge
the commission of a more serious crime, such as burglary.
Some precedent exists for prohibiting the use of evidence found in an illegal
search from juvenile court adjudications. See State v. Lowry, 95 N.J. Super. 307,
230 A.2d 907 (1967); In re Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91 (Sup. Ct.),
affd., 30 A.D.2d 1051, 295 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1966). Although these decisions are
limited to arrests for acts that would be criminal if committed by an adult, they are
still applicable to the present discussion since the issue is not the validity of the arrest
for curfew violation, but its use as a "disguised" arrest for another crime.
223. The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings mandated by In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970), is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
.
224. Usually no fixed sentences are defined by statute in the juvenile justice system. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS§ 712A.18 (Supp. 1977).
225. When a vagrancy ordinance is similarly misused, the adult is, of course, only
subject to the lesser penalties for the vagrancy conviction.
226. The parallel between this curfew exclusionary rule and the exclusionary
rules of the fourth or fifth amendment is somewhat misleading. It is true that, under
the constitutional rule as well as the curfew rule, convictions of some clearly guilty
defendants will be voided because of police misconduct, see, e.g., Brewer v. Williams,
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In practice, however, the authorities can avoid this result.

This
policy would require the juvenile to prove that the curfew· arrest was
illegitimate, which could not be done unless the police and prosecutor attempted to use evidence resulting from the curfew arrest to
demonstrate that the defendant may have committed another crime. 227
So long as the state used curfew arrests solely as the basis for curfew
prosecutions, the juvenile who may have also committed a more
serious offense still could be convicted of curfew violation.
· In the final analysis, the special enforcement problems inherent
in curfew legislation can be overcome by a wise legislature and prudent police and prosecutors. A carefully drafted, sensibly administered juvenile curfew can make a genuine contribution to the general
welfare of the community that adopts it.

430 U.S. 387 (1977), and, as a practical matter, reconviction may be impossible.
However, the curfew exclusionary rule, unlike the constitutional rule, would deter
only a special kind of police misconduct-that which is provoked by the suspicion
that the defendant was guilty of other criminal activity. Thus, those whose convictions would be voided under the curfew rule would not be a random sample of youthful defendants, but-if the police suspicions have any validity-precisely those juveniles most in need of juvenile court services:
227. The proof of whether the arrest was a subterfuge is likely to turn more upon
the behavior of the prosecutor than the policeman. Since the prosecutor, unlike the
police officer, does not have to make immediate decisions under tense conditions, this
rule need not provoke the same controversies over good-faith error that have plagued
the Miranda and Mapp rules.

APPENDIX

Model Curfew Ordinance
In order to reduce juvenile crime, protect the children of this municipality, and reinforce parental authority, be it enacted by the city
of----§1 It shall be unlawfula for any child under the age of seventeenh
to be in or upon any public street, highway, park, vacant lot or other
public place between the hours of 11 :00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
§2 The following shall constitute valid exceptions to the operation of the curfew:
(a) At any time, if the child is accompanied by his or her parent,
legal guardian, or other responsible person who is over the age of twentyone and approved by the child's parent or legal guardian.
{b) Until the hour of 12:30 a.m., if the child is on an errand as
directed by his or her parent or legal guardian.
( c) If the child is legally employed, for the period from one-half
hour before to one-half hour after work, while going directly between his
or her home and place of employment. This exception shall also apply if
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the child is in a public place during curfew hours in the course of his
or her employment. To come under this exception, the child must be
carrying a written statement from the employer attesting to the place
and hours of employment.
(d) Until the hour of 12:30 a.m., if the child is on the property of
or the sidewalk directly adjacent to the building in which he or she
resides or the buildings immediately adjacent thereto.
(e) If the child is coming directly home from a meeting or a place of
public entertain.ment, such as a movie, play, or sporting event. This
exception will 'apply for one-half hour after the completion of such
event, but in no case beyond 12~30 a.m. If the event is not commercial
in nature or does not have a fixed. publicly known time at which it
will end, the sponsoring organization must register the event with the
Police Department at least 24 hours in advance, informing it of the
time such event is scheduled to begin, the place at which it shall be
held, the time at which it shall end, and the name of the sponsoring
organization.
·
§3 A police officer who has probable cause to believe that a child
is in violation of this ordinance shall take such child to the police
station where the child's parents or guardian shall be immediately
contacted. If after this contact there is still probable cause to believe that
the child was violating this ordinance, the child shall be held until the
parent or guardian comes to take the child home. When the parent
or guardian arrives, he or she must be given a copy of this ordinance.
If no parent or guardian has arrived within two hours, the child shall
be turned over to the custody of the juvenile authorities until a parent
or guardian can take custody of him or her.
§4 It shall be unlawful for any parent or guardian to permit or
by inefficient control allow a violation of this ordinance by a child in
his or her custody or control. A first violation of this section of the
ordinance shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed $25.00. A second
or further violation shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed $100.00.

a The disposition after a finding of guilty will be determined by the section of
municipal code or state statute dealing generally with disposition of juveniles adjudged
delinquent. Curfew violations would not, of course, be grounds for transfer to adult
court.
b A younger age limit may be used. In no case should the age limit exceed the
age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction.

